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A CORPORATION HAS NO SOUL—THE BUSINESS 
ENTITY LAW RESPONSE TO CHALLENGES TO THE 
PPACA CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE  
THOMAS E. RUTLEDGE* 
ABSTRACT 
The most contentious matter in the implementation of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act is not one of health care, but rather one 
of the law of business organizations. Numerous for-profit business organi-
zations have challenged the portion of the PPACA and its related regula-
tions requiring that group health insurance plans provide, on a no-cost 
sharing basis, coverage for a variety of procedures and prescription medi-
cines involving contraception and what some describe as “abortificants.” 
In these suits, the various business ventures and their owners assert that 
they should be exempt from the requirement of the mandate on the basis 
that, inter alia, compliance therewith would violate the religious beliefs of 
the organizations’ ownership and management. The problem with this posi-
tion is that it treats the business entity as the nominee of either its owner-
ship or management, asserting that what is done by the organization is in 
effect done on their behalf. This paradigm is not, however, consistent with 
the law of business organizations where the business entity is a legal person 
distinct from its shareholders or investors. Alternatively, it is claimed that 
the religious beliefs of the organization itself are violated by the mandate. 
Again, this argument fails on the basis that a business organization does not 
have religious beliefs. Rather, as has been famously put, “a corporation 
has no soul.” 
 
Ultimately, these lawsuits fail as a matter of standing; the owners 
are not subject to the mandate, and the corporation or other business 
entity has no religious views violated thereby. 
                                                                                                                         
* Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky. © 2014 by the Author. The Author 
is also a member of the American Law Institute. 
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The most contentious matter in the implementation of the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is not a question of health care, 
but rather one of the law of business organizations. The dispute has been 
over the requirement that group health insurance plans provide, on a no-cost 
sharing basis, coverage for FDA-approved contraceptive procedures and pre-
scription medicines; for purposes of this Article, this requirement is labeled 
the “Mandate.”1 Essentially, in one class of suits, various employers—each 
an expressly religious organization such as the University of Notre Dame2 
or a Catholic dioceses or archdioceses3—have challenged the application 
of the Mandate to them on the basis that the drugs and procedures required 
by the Mandate conflict with their religious beliefs, and therefore they must 
be exempt therefrom on constitutional grounds. Consequent to an expansion 
of the regulatory exemption from the Mandate occasioned in February 2013, 
these expressly religious organizations are now exempt from the Mandate.4 
The regulatory exemption from the Mandate for expressly religious or-
ganizations, which itself is not constitutionally required,5 will significantly 
                                                                                                                         
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121 (2012)), as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152 (March 30, 2010). To a limited degree 
the challenges have also involved objections to a requirement to cover “lifestyle” drugs such 
as Viagra and Cialis. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 20, M.K. Chambers Co. v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 
1340719 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2013) (No. 2:13-cv-11379-DPH-MJH). This “Mandate” is 
separate and distinct from the “Individual Mandate” of § 1501 of the PPACA. The Indi-
vidual Mandate requires, subject to certain exceptions, that beginning in 2014 all persons 
either be covered by a federally-approved insurance policy, either purchased directly or 
acquired through employment, or pay certain penalties. The Supreme Court upheld the 
Individual Mandate on the basis of Congress’s powers under the taxing clause. Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
2 Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:12CV253RLM, 2012 WL 6756332 (N.D. Ind. 
May 21, 2012). 
3 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Sebelius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 8 
(D.D.C. 2013); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
4 See infra notes 47–71 and accompanying text. 
5 There is no constitutional requirement to create a regulatory exemption from the ap-
plication of the Mandate. Although exemptions may, on appropriate facts, be necessary to 
accommodate constitutional protections, it does not follow that those exemptions must be 
statutory or regulatory. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879). See 
also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120–21 (1990). The exemption serves as a political accommodation 
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reduce the need for judicial determinations of exemption based upon Free 
Exercise rights.6 Undoubtedly, there will continue to be fact specific disputes 
regarding the application of the exemption to particular organizations assert-
ing that they are “religious employers.”7 The primary continuing dispute is 
upon the demands for exception from the Mandate made on behalf of non-
religious, typically for-profit, organizations.8 
                                                                                                                         
in response to expected constitutional challenges, in effect conceding that entities falling 
within its scope likely would prevail in a dispute to the merits on whether the Mandate, as 
applied, violates the Free Exercise rights of those within its scope. To provide but one ad-
ditional example of a legislative exemption, during the pendency of the 18th Amendment 
enacting prohibition, wine remained available for sacramental purposes. See National 
Prohibition (Volstead) Act, 27 U.S.C. § 16 (1919) (repealed 1935). See also Perry Dane, 
Exemptions for Religion Contained in Regulatory Statues, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 559 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006). 
Excessively broad regulatory exemptions from the application of the Mandate them-
selves give rise to constitutional challenges. A determination to extend an exemption from 
the Mandate to “any for-profit corporation that self-certifies that it violates the religious 
beliefs of the majority of the shareholders” or “any for-profit corporation that meets 
criteria X, Y and Z” would raise a host of problems. First, excessive deference to religious 
views may create Establishment Clause problems. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); see also Corp. of the Presiding Bishops of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 349 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(questioning whether exemption of religious corporation’s for-profit activities constitutes 
a violation of the Establishment Clause); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) 
(“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination 
cannot be officially preferred over another.”). Second, setting and weighting criteria as to 
what does or does not constitute a sufficiently religious corporation in itself creates 
Establishment problems in defining what is and then, by implication, what is not a reli-
gion. See infra note 134. These concerns will not be further addressed in this Article. 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I [hereinafter Free Exercise Clause] (“Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....”). 
7 See infra notes 40–71 and accompanying text. 
8 As detailed below, for-profit ventures have no basis for claiming an exemption from 
the Mandate based upon religious beliefs. It does not follow, and the author expressly 
rejects the notion, that the for-profit/non-profit divide is the appropriate starting point for 
determining that ventures may ab initio seek exemption from the Mandate. The taxonomy 
of non-profit ventures is a more involved process than is that for for-profit ventures. For 
example, many dioceses and archdioceses are organized as “corporation’s sole,” an organi-
zational form that is a corporation in name only. Being the bishop or archbishop, it would be 
difficult to contemplate a situation in which it could not properly be said that a “corporation” 
has a religious belief protected by the Free Exercise Clause. A § 501(c)(3) or (4) sponsored 
and operated by a religious body is the next step in the progression, and then there is the 
§ 501(c)(3) or (4) that has a relationship to a religious body but which is not directly oper-
ated by it. These questions, all terribly complicated, will need to be addressed elsewhere. 
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This second class of suits, and those subject to this discussion, were not 
filed by religious organizations but rather by for-profit business ventures,9 
asserting that they should be exempt from the requirements of the Mandate 
on the basis that, inter alia, compliance therewith would violate the religious 
beliefs of the organization’s ownership and management.10 The problem with 
this argument is it treats the business organization as the nominee of its own-
ership or management, asserting that what is done by the organization is in 
effect done on their behalf. That paradigm is not, however, the law of busi-
ness organizations.11 Alternatively, it is claimed that the religious beliefs of 
the organization itself are violated by the Mandate. This argument fails be-
cause a business organization does not have religious beliefs. Rather, as it 
has been famously put, “a corporation has no soul.”12 
Ultimately, this is a question of standing. Not addressed herein is whether 
the Mandate is a burden on Free Exercise, whether that burden is substan-
tial, and whether the burden—even if substantial—is narrowly crafted to 
satisfy a compelling interest, all of which would be necessary to prevail on a 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act challenge.13 Ultimately, those questions 
do not need to be resolved. Rather, by applying settled principles of busi-
ness organization law, it is clear there is no natural or juridical person whose 
Free Exercise rights are burdened by the Mandate. 
This Article will first review the development of the Mandate and the 
steps involved in arriving at the final regulatory exemption therefrom for 
“religious employers.” Part II will review the various challenges brought by 
for-profit ventures to the Mandate, address the Free Exercise Clause rights of 
business entities and the limited case law on the business entity being treated 
as the mere nominee of the owners in the discharging of its legal obligations. 
Part III will review the positive law of business organizations, which is pre-
mised upon the distinctions between the owners and the entity, they being rec-
ognized at law as distinct jural persons. Part IV will address the application 
                                                                                                                         
9 See, e.g., Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1118, 2013 WL 1276025 (8th Cir. 
Feb. 1, 2013) (medical devices); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626 (E.D. Mich. 
2013) (natural foods company); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 
2012) (HVAC equipment); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 
(W.D. Okla. 2012) (arts and crafts stores); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 2:12-CV-92-DDN, 2012 WL 6738489 (S.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2012) (farm-
ing, dairy, creamery, and cheese-making); Complaint at 2, Armstrong v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-
cv-00563 (D. Colo. filed Mar. 5, 2013) (residential mortgage banking company). 
10 See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 77–104 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
13 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
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of settled principles of business entity law to the arguments of those who con-
tend the Mandate violates the rights of either the entity or its owners, demon-
strating each argument is facially and fatally flawed. The Conclusion is based 
on the venerable rule damnum absque injuria. 
I. THE PPACA MANDATE 
A. Pre-PPACA Efforts to Require Coverage of Contraception 
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployer’s disability benefits plan did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 196414 by not providing disability benefits for the period employees 
were absent from work due to pregnancy.15 Congress responded by passing 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, amending Title VII “to prohibit 
sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.”16 This legislation did not, how-
ever, require coverage for contraception, whether by means of prescription 
drugs or surgically. 
In 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) pro-
nounced that employers must cover the expenses of prescription contracep-
tives to the same extent they cover the expenses of other types of drugs and 
preventive care.17 Although influential (it being the enforcer of Title VII), 
an EEOC decision is nonetheless without the force of law. The Eighth Cir-
cuit effectively disregarded it in In re Union Pacific Railroad Employment 
Practices Litigation, ruling that exclusion of all prescription contraception 
from coverage under an employee health insurance plan does not constitute 
gender discrimination against female employees, and thus does not violate 
Title VII as amended by the PDA,18 thereby providing justification for health 
care plans that exclude contraception coverage.19 
                                                                                                                         
14 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)). 
15 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128–29 (1976). 
16 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)) [hereinafter the PDA]. 
17 EEOC Decision on Coverage of Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http:// 
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html. 
18 See In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2007). 
Subsequent legislative efforts to mandate coverage for contraception prescriptions and 
procedures failed. See, e.g., Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage 
Act of 2007, H.R. 2413, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); Putting Prevention First Act of 2004, 
H.R. 4192, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004); Putting Prevention First Act of 2004, S. 2336, 
108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004). 
19 This decision is in contrast to that rendered in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. 
Supp. 2d 1266, 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“In light of the fact that prescription contraceptives 
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B. PPACA and the Mandate 
Signed into law on March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (PPACA) was the signature legislation of the first term of the 
Obama Administration.20 Of central importance to this discussion are those 
provisions of the PPACA that require, subject to certain exceptions,21 in-
surance plans that provide prescription drug coverage to include contra-
ception coverage on a no cost-sharing basis, in other words, no deductible 
or co-pay.22 Encompassed therein are daily birth control pills, hormonal 
patches, and hormonal injections.23 In addition, the coverage must extend to 
Plan B, ella, and similar drugs that fall within the category of “morning after 
pills.”24 Last, the plans must provide equal coverage for surgical contra-
ception, such as intra-uterine devices and tubal ligations.25 Collectively, 
these requirements constitute the “Mandate.” Ergo, while there is no require-
ment that a health care insurance policy provide a prescription drug benefit, 
subject to the grandfathering of certain existing plans,26 if one is provided then 
contraception prescriptions must be covered on a no-cost sharing basis. 
                                                                                                                         
are used only by women, Bartell’s choice to exclude that particular benefit from its gen-
erally applicable benefit plan is discriminatory.”). 
20 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18121 (2012)), as amended by the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152 (March 30, 2010). 
21 Even as the PPACA contains the Mandate, its application must be considered in light 
of the grandfathering of most insurance policies. Plans existing on March 23, 2010, and 
from that day maintained in force, including by renewal, are exempt from the requirement 
to satisfy the Mandate. See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance 
Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,540 (June 17, 2010) [hereinafter Interim Final 
Rules]. See also 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2714T(g) (2012) (listing requirements for maintaining 
grandfathered status). The number of plans that have grandfathered status and the number 
of beneficiaries thereof who lack the coverage required by the Mandate is open to question. 
It is entirely possible that some grandfathered plans provided the coverage required by 
the Mandate. 
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010). HRSA guidelines, in turn, require coverage, 
without cost sharing, for, among other things, “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [(FDA)] 
approved contraceptive methods ... for all women with reproductive capacity.” 77 Fed. 
Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
23 See Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:// 
www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/ucm313215.htm 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See Interim Final Rules, at 34,545 (stating that plans in which individuals were en-
rolled on March 23, 2010, are not subject to the preventive services provision). 
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The PPACA requires that the women’s preventive health guidelines 
proposed by the HHS be evidence-based and comprehensive.27 In order to 
promulgate such guidelines, a panel of experts convened by the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM Committee) was charged to “review the science and make 
recommendations for what women’s preventive health services should be 
covered.”28 The IOM Committee, acting as the scientific resource for HHS’s 
final coverage rule, focused on diseases and conditions more common in 
women than in men.29 Between November 2010 and May 2011, the IOM 
Committee held various informative meetings and public forums on preven-
tive services for women and gathered extensive information on numerous 
topics related to health and health care services for women.30 
The IOM Committee found that contraception and contraceptive coun-
seling were not currently included in the range of preventive services avail-
able to women under the PPACA,31 and recommended that preventive 
services for women, among other things, “the full range of Food and Drug 
Administration-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and 
patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity”32 
be covered. However, the PPACA required the IOM’s recommendations be 
“supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration” (HRSA) 
before they could be implemented.33 After presentation, the HRSA adopted 
them in large part on August 1, 2011.34 Consequently, new health plans had 
                                                                                                                         
27 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1001, § 2713, 
124 Stat. 119, 131 (2010). 
28 Press Release, Barbara A. Mikulski U.S. Senator for Md. Media Ctr., Mikulski Ap-
plauds Adoption of IOM Guidelines For Women’s Preventive Health (Aug. 1, 2011), 
available at http://www.mikulski.senate.gov/media/pressrelease/8-1-2011-1.cfm. 
29 Id. 
30 INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 
16, 22–23 (2011) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]. 
31 Id. at 109–10. As support for its recommendation (Recommendation 5.5), the IOM 
Report found “evidence that contraception and contraceptive counseling are effective at 
reducing unintended pregnancies.... Numerous health professional associations recommend 
family planning services as part of preventive care for women. Furthermore, a reduction 
in unintended pregnancies has been identified as a specific goal in Healthy People 2010 
and Healthy People 2020.” Id. at 109. 
32 Id. This is “Recommendation 5.5” in the IOM Report. 
33 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1001, § 2713(a)(4), 
124 Stat. 119, 131 (2010). 
34 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Affordable Care Act Ensures 
Women Receive Preventive Services at No Additional Cost (Aug. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/08/20110801b.html. 
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to include, inter alia, “FDA-approved contraception methods and contracep-
tive counseling” without cost sharing for “insurance policies with plan years 
beginning on or after August 1, 2012.”35 
The Mandate is enforced by financial penalties:36 employers who do not 
comply face enforcement actions,37 a penalty of $100 per day per employee,38 
and an annual tax surcharge of $2,000 per employee.39 
C. The First Exemption from the Mandate 
HHS requested public comments after the publication of the interim 
final regulations, which included the IOM’s recommendations.40 While 
many commenters supported the inclusion of contraceptive services for all 
women with no exemptions, others took the position that requiring group 
health plans sponsored by religious employers to cover such services “that 
their faith deems contrary to its religious tenets” would encroach upon re-
ligious freedom.41 In response to those comments, the interim final rules 
were amended to provide HRSA increased discretion to exempt “religious 
employers” from the Mandate,42 and provided a definition thereof: 
[F]or purposes of this policy, a religious employer is one that: (1) Has the 
inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs per-
sons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who share 
its religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization under § 6033(a)(1) 
and § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code.43 
HHS again accepted comments and considered alternative definitions 
through January 20, 2012.44 On that date, HHS announced the adoption of 
                                                                                                                         
35 Id. See also IOM REPORT, supra note 30. 
36 These provisions are distinct from the tax penalty (the annual “shared responsibility 
payment”) through which the Individual Mandate is enforced. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) (2010). 
37 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2009). 
38 See 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(a), (b) (2005). 
39 See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2010). 
40 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 
(Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Amendment to Interim Final Rules]. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2011). 
44 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., A Statement by U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Jan. 20, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html. 
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the religious employer exemption as it was defined in the Amendment to the 
Interim Final Rules.45 In effect, this definition of a “religious employer” 
exempts only churches and other “houses of worship” from the Mandate.46 
Affiliated religious organizations such as hospitals, schools, universities and 
social welfare organizations were not thereby exempted by the regulations 
from the Mandate. 
D. The Second Exemption from the Mandate 
Contemporaneous with the issuance of the final rules, HHS issued 
guidelines establishing a temporary enforcement safe harbor under which 
“non-exempted, non-grandfathered group health plans established or main-
tained by non-profit organizations” that traditionally did not cover prescrip-
tion contraceptives for religious reasons were granted an additional year to 
comply with the rules, meaning until the first plan year beginning on or 
after August 1, 2013.47 HHS pronounced its willingness to compromise by 
maintaining the adopted definition of “religious employer” as required under 
the exemption, but seeking “to develop alternative ways of providing con-
traceptive coverage without cost sharing with respect to non-exempted, non-
profit religious organizations with religious objections to such coverage.”48 
In March 2012, HHS issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(ANPRM) expressing its intention to promulgate the above amendments to 
the final regulations and invited public comment.49 Subsequent to the release 
                                                                                                                         
45 Id. 
46 See Contraceptive Coverage in the Health Care Law: What’s New as of August 1, 
2012?, NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH CTR. (Feb. 25, 2013), available at http://www.nwlc.org 
/resource/contraceptive-coverage-health-care-law-what%E2%80%99s-new-august-1-2012; 
see also Amendment to Interim Final Rules, at 46623. 
47 Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) & Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe 
Harbor for Certain Employers, Group Health Plans and Group Health Insurance Issuers 
with Respect to the Requirement to Cover Contraceptive Services Without Cost Sharing 
Under Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act, Section 715(a)(1) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act, and Section 9815(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 28, 2013), www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources 
/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/preventive-services-guidance-6-28-20 13.pdf. 
48 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 
(Feb. 15, 2012) (emphasis added). 
49 Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501, 
16,503 (Mar. 21, 2012); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Adminis-
tration Releases Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Preventive Services Policy 
(Mar. 16, 2012), available at www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/03/20120316g.html. 
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of the ANPRM, HHS received over 200,000 comments representing a wide 
variety of stakeholders.50 Although some comments specifically addressed 
preferences for alternative means of accommodating, many focused on the 
scope of the religious employer exemption.51 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services announced on 
February 1, 2013, a new “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” that would appear 
to accommodate many of the objections raised by non-profit religious insti-
tutions like Catholic Charities.52 The two principal changes to the Mandate 
broaden the scope of religious activities covered and provide alternative fund-
ing of contraceptive coverage for other religiously affiliated institutions.53 
Regarding which previously non-exempt religious entities will meet the 
requirements for recognition as “religious employers” and thus qualify for 
the new proposed accommodation, HHS proposed to amend the definition 
adopted in the 2012 final rules by deleting the first three prongs54 and clar-
ifying application of the fourth.55 Thus: 
[a]n employer that is organized and operates as a non-profit entity and 
referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code would be con-
sidered a religious employer for purposes of the religious employer ex-
emption. For this purpose, an organization that is organized and operates 
as a nonprofit entity is not limited to any particular form of entity under 
state law, but may include organizations such as trusts and unincorpo-
rated associated, as well as nonprofit, not-for-profit, non-stock, public 
benefit, and similar types of corporations.56 
This rule, as proposed, clarifies that churches and other houses of wor-
ship the current exemption “intended” to cover would not be disqualified 
solely because they provide charitable social services to or employ people 
of other faiths.57 In eliminating the first three elements of the “religious 
                                                                                                                         
50 See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 8456, 8459 (proposed Feb. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Proposed Rules]. 
51 Id. 
52 See also Patricia Zapor, HHS Offers New Contraceptive Insurance Options, Broad-
ening Exemptions, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.catholicnews 
.com/data/stories/cns/1300438.htm. 
53 See Proposed Rules, at 8456–57.  
54 Id. at 8461. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. (“The Departments agree that the exemption should not exclude group health 
plans of religious entities that would qualify for the exemption but for the fact that, for ex-
ample, they provide charitable social services to persons of different religious faiths ... when 
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employer” definition previously proposed, the necessity of inquiry into an 
employer’s purposes, the religious beliefs of its employees, and the reli-
gious beliefs of those it serves, the analytic framework was rendered more 
objective. Most important for purposes of this review, under this expanded 
exemption non-profit status is a required element, and, “for this purpose, 
an organization is not considered to be organized and operated as a non-
profit entity if its assets or income accrue to the benefit of private individ-
uals or shareholders.”58 
The second significant change under the HHS-proposed rules would be 
an accommodation (the “Accommodation”) that would “protect eligible or-
ganizations from having to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for contraceptive 
coverage” to which they have a religious objection.59 The process is essen-
tially as follows: eligible organizations would inform their insurers they 
qualify for the Accommodation. The insurers would then contact the orga-
nizations’ employees and explain they would provide them with contracep-
tive coverage at no cost through a completely separate insurance policy that 
is in no way connected to the religious employer. The insurers could recoup 
that cost by paying less than they typically would to participate in the new 
state health exchanges.60 For purposes of the Accommodation, an “eligible 
organization” is an organization that: 
[O]pposes providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive ser-
vices required to be covered [on account of religious objections]; (2) is 
organized and operates as a nonprofit entity; (3) holds itself out as a re-
ligious organization; and (4) self-certifies that it meets these criteria in 
accordance with the provisions of the final regulations.61 
In addition to eligible organizations with insured and self-insured group 
health plans, HHS would also propose that an eligible nonprofit religious 
organization that is “an institution of higher education that arranges for 
health insurance coverage” could “avail itself of an accommodation compa-
rable to that for an eligible organization that is an employer with an insured 
                                                                                                                         
running a parochial school. Indeed, this was never the Departments’ intention in connection 
with the 2011 amended interim final rules or the 2012 final rules.”). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 8459. 
60 Id. at 8462–63. 
61 Id. at 8462. See also Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight, 
Women’s Preventive Services Coverage and Non-Profit Religious Organizations, CTRS. 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (June 28, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources 
/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womens-preven-02012013.html. 
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group health plan.”62 This Accommodation extends to religiously affiliated 
universities, such as Notre Dame and Catholic University of America, and 
religious organizations such as the Archdiocese of New York, which were 
among some forty-three Catholic groups that filed suit claiming that the fed-
eral government was forcing them to support contraception and birth control 
or face steep fines.63  
HHS’s objective is that contraception coverage be provided to employ-
ees on a no cost-sharing basis;64 the Accommodation shifts the financial bur-
den from the employer purchasing the employee group health insurance plan 
to the plan provider.65 Specifically, HHS explains in the new proposed rules 
that health insurance issuers would automatically provide separate, individ-
ual market contraceptive coverage at no cost for plan participants, it being 
asserted that:  
[I]ssuers generally would find that providing such contraceptive coverage 
is [at least] cost neutral because they would be ... insuring the same set of 
individuals under both [the group health insurance] policies and [the sep-
arate individual contraceptive coverage policies and, as a result,] would 
experience lower costs from improvements in women’s health, healthier 
timing and spacing of pregnancies, and fewer unplanned pregnancies.66 
                                                                                                                         
62 Text of New Rules to Address Contraception Controversy, WASHINGTON WIRE, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2013, 11:32 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/02/01/text-of 
-new-rules-to-address-contraception-controversy/. 
63 Most of the challenges brought by religious entities were held in abeyance pending 
the release of the final rules as to the Accommodation. See Priests for Life v. Sebelius, No. 
12-CV-753 (FB), 2013 WL 1563390, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2013); Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Washington v. Sebelius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2013); Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). See also Priests for 
Life v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Civil No. 13-1261, 2013 WL 5572730 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 2, 2013) and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Sebelius, Civil Action 
No. 13-14410, 2013 WL 5570185 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2013) (both indicating that rulings on the 
merits would be issued prior to January 1, 2014). 
64 Proposed Rules, supra note 50, at 8460 (“The Departments aim to secure the pro-
tections under section 2713 of the PHS Act that are designed to enhance coverage of 
important preventive services for women without cost sharing while accommodating the 
religious objections to contraceptive coverage of eligible organizations.”). 
65 See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Women’s Preventive Services 
and Religious Institutions (Feb. 10, 2012),  available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press 
-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-s-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions. 
66 Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 39,870, 39,877 (July 2, 2013); see also Group Health Plans and Health Insurance 
Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8727 (Feb. 15, 2012) (“A 2000 study estimated 
that it would cost employers 15 to 17 percent more not to provide contraceptive coverage 
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A proposal to amend the PPACA to include an exemption from the 
benefits otherwise required under the PPACA, based upon the “religious 
beliefs or moral convictions of the sponsor, issuer, or other entity offering 
the plan[,]” 67  the so-called “Blunt Amendment,” was voted down on 
March 1, 2012.68  
On June 28, 2013, HHS, the Department of Labor, and the Department 
of the Treasury released final regulations as to (1) the regulatory exemption 
from the Mandate for churches and (2) the Accommodation for religious 
organizations that are not churches.69 The final rules essentially adopt both 
revised exemptions that the Accommodation proposed. The primary sub-
stantive changes are in the regulatory simplification of the Accommodation’s 
implementation. As such, churches, other houses of worship, and certain 
closely affiliated activities are exempt from the Mandate.70 Religiously 
                                                                                                                         
in employee health plans than to provide such coverage, after accounting for both the 
direct medical costs of pregnancy and the indirect costs such as employee absence and 
reduced productivity.”). 
67 158 CONG. REC. S1079 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2012). 
68 See, N.C. Aizenman & Rosalind S. Helderman, Birth Control Exemption Bill, The 
‘Blunt Amendment,’ Killed in Senate, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www  
.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/birth-control-exemption-bill-the-blunt-amend 
ment-killed-in-senate/2012/03/01/gIQA4tXjkR_story.html. Additional pushes to add further 
“conscience” exemptions were made during the October 2013 budget standoff/government 
shutdown; none have succeeded as of January 16, 2014. See, e.g., Health Care Conscience 
Rights Act, S. 1204, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Health Care Conscience Rights Act, 
H.R. 940, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). See also Steve Benen, Contraception Restrictions 
Remain a Top Republican Priority, MSNBC (Oct. 15, 2013, 12:20 AM), http://www 
.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/contraception-still-gop-focus. Similar efforts have been 
undertaken at the state level, either through legislation or in the courts. See, e.g., H.B. 2625, 
50th Legislature, 2d Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); H.B. 2625, 15th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Az. 
2013); H.B. 351, 130th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2013-14); Mo. Ins. Coalition 
v. Huff, No. 4:12CV02354 AGF, 2013 WL 2250430 (E.D. Mo. May 22, 2013) (striking 
down under the Supremacy Clause Missouri statute affording conscience exemption from 
the Mandate). 
69 See Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,873 (July 2, 2013); see also Press Release, U.S. Department of Health 
& Human Servs., Administration Issues Final Rules on Contraception Coverage and 
Religious Organizations (June 28, 2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press /2013 
pres/06/20130628a.html. 
70 Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 39,873, 39,892–93 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 
2590). On grounds that will here not be reviewed, the Accommodation was recently held to 
violate the Free Exercise rights of the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Zubik v. Sebelius, Nos. 13cv1459, 
13cv0303 Erie, 2013 WL 6118696 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2013). Other courts considering 
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sponsored employers such as hospitals and universities are exempt from 
the Mandate; their employees and the students covered by university-
sponsored health care plans will receive contraception coverage by means 
of the Accommodation.71 
II. CHALLENGES TO THE MANDATE FROM FOR-PROFIT VENTURES 
At no juncture in the development of the regulatory exemptions from 
the Mandate has it been proposed that for-profit business ventures should 
be encompassed therein. Still, many such ventures have asserted in various 
suits that they too deserve exemption from the Mandate.72 
Hobby Lobby, Autocam and the numerous other business entities have 
resisted the Mandate on the basis that satisfying its requirements will require 
them to violate their religious beliefs.73 Who, however, are “them”? In one 
                                                                                                                         
challenges to the Accommodation have found that it does not violate the Free Exercise rights 
of religious non-profits. See, e.g., Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, No. 3:13-01303, 
2013 WL 6834375 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 26, 2013). 
71 Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 39,893. 
72 Almost all of the owners of these for-profit businesses are Roman Catholic. See, 
e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Complaint ¶ 3, 
SMA, LLC v. Sebelius, No. 0:13-cv-01375 (D. Minn. June 7, 2013); Complaint ¶ 15, 
Johnson Welded Prods., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00609-ESH (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2013). 
There are, however, exceptions. See, e.g., Beckwith Electric Co. v. Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-
0648-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 3297498, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 2013) (“Southern Baptist”); 
Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-3459-CV-S-RED, 
2012 WL 6951316, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012) (“Evangelical Christians”); Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“Mennonite 
Christian”); Amended Complaint ¶ 15, Holland v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 2:13-cv-15487 (S.D.W. Va. June 26, 2013) (“born-again Christian”). 
73 See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 8, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 
1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. 5:12-cv-01000-HE) (“The administrative rule at issue in this 
case (‘the Mandate’) runs roughshod over the Green family’s religious beliefs, and the 
beliefs of millions of other Americans, by forcing them to provide health insurance cover-
age for abortion-inducing drugs and devices, as well as related education and counseling.”); 
Complaint ¶ 26, Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735 
(S.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2012) (No. 3:12-cv-01072-MJR-PMF) (“Plaintiffs Cyril B. Korte and 
Jane E. Korte believe that they cannot arrange for, pay for, provide, facilitate, or other-
wise support employee health plan coverage for contraceptives, sterilization, abortion, or 
related education and counseling without violating their religious beliefs ....”); id. ¶ 31 
(“Under the terms of the Mandate, Plaintiffs will not be permitted to obtain coverage that 
excludes the aforementioned drugs and services. On the contrary, the Mandate will require 
that Plaintiffs continue to provide their employees with coverage of those services, activities, 
and practices that Plaintiffs consider sinful and immoral.”); Complaint ¶¶ 17, 25, Infra-
structure Alternatives, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00031-RJJ (W.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2013) 
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alternative, the business entity takes on the religious beliefs of its owners and 
management, asserting, inter alia, that complying with the Mandate would 
violate the entities’ religious beliefs.74 In the second alternative, the activities 
                                                                                                                         
(“Plaintiffs Cretens and Trierweiler [who own eighty-seven percent of the corporation 
plaintiff] are adherents of the Catholic faith as defined by the Magisterium, the teaching 
authority of the Catholic Church, which prohibits Plaintiffs from participating in, paying 
for, facilitating, training others to engage in, or otherwise cooperating with the practice of 
contraception and sterilization, particularly abortifacients.”). 
74 Although this discussion is framed in terms of the Mandate and its requirement of 
coverage for contraception, the analytic protocol as to whether the Mandate violates Free 
Exercise rights is not restricted to the Mandate. The same analysis would apply to other reli-
giously based objections to other aspects of required provisions of health insurance plans. 
The United States encompasses a nearly unbelievably diverse mix of religious faiths. 
See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 723 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (describing the United 
States as “a Nation of unparalleled pluralism and religious tolerance.”). Those various faiths 
have any number of specific beliefs, requirements, and limitations. It is unnecessary to go to 
the extreme of questioning whether there is a Free Exercise violation in generally applicable 
rules against murder as applied to faiths involving human sacrifice. See, e.g., JULIUS 
CAESAR, CAESAR’S COMMENTARIES ON THE GALLIC WAR 202–03 (Lee & Shepard 1904) 
(Druids). However, it is appropriate to consider whether religious belief-based requirements 
may be cited in seeking additional exemptions from the minimum benefit requirements of 
the PPACA. Based upon the Free Exercise rights of the shareholders, may a corporation 
owned by those of the Scientology faith insist that any health insurance policy not cover 
psychiatric treatments? See, e.g., Katharine Mieszkowski, Scientology’s War on Psychiatry, 
SALON (July 1, 2005, 6:37 PM), http://www.salon.com/2005/07/01/sci_psy/. May a corpo-
ration owned by those of the Christian Scientist faith insist that no insurance be required? 
May a corporation owned by a fundamentalist snake handler insist any policy exclude cov-
erage for snake bites suffered in a religious ceremony because the shareholder believes the 
snake bite evidences God’s displeasure with the person bitten and that there should be no 
medical intervention against that displeasure? May a corporation owned by a Mormon fam-
ily insist any company-sponsored insurance policy exclude coverage for illnesses that arise 
from smoking or consuming alcohol? May the corporation owned by Jehovah’s Witnesses 
insist the employee health insurance policy not cover blood transfusions? See, e.g., Why Don’t 
You Accept Blood Transfusions?, JW.ORG, http://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq 
/jehovahs-witnesses-why-no-blood-transfusions/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). Based on the 
religious belief that extra-marital sexual relations are sinful, may the shareholders of a cor-
porate employer insist the health insurance policy not provide benefits for delivery of a child 
conceived out of wedlock? Believing that pre-marital relations are sinful and that the vaccine 
against the human papilloma virus encourages pre-marital relations, may the shareholders of a 
corporation insist the plan it sponsors not cover the cost of this vaccination? See, e.g., Sara 
E. Abiola et al., The Politics of HPV Vaccination Policy Formation in the United States, 38 
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 645, 656, 665 (2013); Robert Taylor, Religious Conservatives 
and Safe Sex, APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper 4 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2105100. The scope of the Mandate is only a small subset of the class of medical 
procedures to which a Free Exercise objection could be raised. Senator Barbara Boxer set 
forth a similar litany of exemptions in argument against The Blunt Amendment. See 158 
CONG. REC. S1080 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2012). See also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 
687–91 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
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of the business entity are treated as those of the owners; in effect, they assert 
that the entity acts as the nominee through which they undertake both busi-
ness activities and religious expression.75 In the third alternative, the busi-
ness entity acts to protect the Free Exercise rights of its owners.76 
Irrespective of the theory upon which Hobby Lobby and other for-
profit ventures attempt to proceed, these assertions are untenable as a 
matter of the law of business organizations. 
III. BUSINESS ENTITY LAW AND SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONHOOD 
A corporation is a legal construct that is the product of positive law. In 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,77 the Supreme Court fa-
mously observed that “[a] corporation is an artificial body, invisible, intan-
gible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature 
of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation 
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”78 
A fundamental purpose of the corporation is to act as a mechanism in 
which title to property may be vested which is not altered or diminished by 
alterations in the corporation’s ownership. Ergo, the corporation may exist 
in perpetuity even though individual shareholders, at least those who are nat-
ural persons, will inevitably die. Hence, it is said that a corporation enjoys 
“perpetual succession.”79 As set forth by one commentator: 
The ordinary incidents to a corporation are, 1. To have perpetual suc-
cession, and, of course, the power of electing members in the room of 
                                                                                                                         
75 See, e.g., Korte, 735 F.3d at 688 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
court equates the business activities of these secular, for-profit firms with the religious 
exercise of it owners.”); Complaint ¶ 33, Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6845677 
(W.D. Mich. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-01096). 
76 See infra notes 165–184.  
77 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
78 Id. at 636. 
79 Id. at 636: 
Among the most important [characteristics of a corporation] are immor-
tality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, 
by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the 
same, and may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to 
manage its own affairs, and to hold property, without the perplexing in-
tricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances 
for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the 
purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities 
and capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in use. 
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those removed by death or otherwise; 2. To sue and be sued and to 
grant and to receive by their corporate name; 3. To purchase and hold 
land and chattels; 4. To have a common seal; 5. To make by-laws for the 
government of the corporation; 6. The power of amotion, or removal of 
members. Some of these power are to be taken, in many instances, with 
much modification and restriction; and the essence of the corporation ... 
consists only of a capacity to have perpetual succession, under a special 
denomination, and an artificial form, and to take and grant property, 
contract obligations, and sue and be sued, by its corporate name, and to 
receive and enjoy, in common, grants of privileges and immunities.80 
Returning to Dartmouth College, the Supreme Court wrote: 
It is, in short, an artificial person, existing in contemplation of law, and 
endowed with certain powers and franchises which, though they must 
be exercised through the medium of its natural members, are yet con-
sidered as subsisting in the corporation itself, as distinctly as if it were a 
real personage. Hence, such a corporation may sue and be sued by its 
own members, and may contract with them in the same manner, as with 
any strangers.81 
There exists a real distinction between the corporation and its shareholders. 
The shareholders do not “do business as” the corporation, but rather, the cor-
poration does business as a distinct legal being.82  The Supreme Court has 
observed: “Incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity 
with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of 
the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs.”83 
                                                                                                                         
80 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 308–09 (7th ed. 1851). 
81 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 667–68. 
82 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-2 (West 2013) ([“E]very corporation ... has 
the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its 
business and affairs ....”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.3-020(1) (West 2013) (“[E]very 
corporation shall have ... the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or 
convenient to carry out its business and affairs ....”). See also Gilardi v. Sebelius, 926 F. 
Supp. 2d 273, 278 (D.D.C. 2013): 
As an initial matter, the Court is troubled by plaintiffs’ apparent disregard 
of the corporate form in this case. Plaintiffs argue that “requiring the two 
corporations to provide group health coverage that the Gilardis consider 
immoral is the same as requiring the Gilardis themselves to provide such 
immoral coverage.” The Court strongly disagrees. The Gilardis have 
chosen to conduct their business through corporations, with their accom-
panying rights and benefits and limited liability. They cannot simply 
disregard that same corporate status when it is advantageous to do so.  
(Citation omitted). 
83 Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). See also CHARLES 
B. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8 (5th ed. 1923) (“The 
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The law of business organizations is replete with examples of the sepa-
rateness of the organization from its owners. Initially, shareholders are not, 
qua shareholders, liable for the debts and obligations of the corporation.84 
The management and affairs of the corporation are vested not in the share-
holders but rather in the board of directors.85 The property of the corporation 
                                                                                                                         
idea of separate personality, (or, in unfigurative language, as a special association which the 
law deals with in some respects as if constituting a separate personality), is at the base of the 
corporation concept. The sharp line of demarcation between the collective person and the 
separate members, expressed the fundamental idea underlying the Roman law of corpora-
tions.... But the English common law fully recognized the separate personality of the corporate 
entity. It inherited this principle from the Roman law and adorned it with such metaphysical 
concepts as ‘invisibility,’ ‘intangibility,’ ‘immortality,’ and ‘soullessness.’” (citations omitted)). 
84 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-26-3(b) 
(West 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.6-220(1) (West 2013); MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 6.22(a) (2010). The same rule applies in the context of an LLC, its members en-
joying limited liability from its debts and obligations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
303(a) (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-3-3(a) (West 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 275.150(1) (West 2013); ABA Comm. on LLCs, Partnerships and Unincorporated 
Entities, REVISED PROTOTYPE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 304 (2011), http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/business_law/201105_business_law 
_llcs_rpllca_may_2011.authcheckdam.pdf; see also 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 14 (2006) (arguing that a corporation 
may be properly organized for the avowed purpose of maintaining it as a separate entity free 
from shareholder responsibility for the corporation’s debts); BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE 
TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 6 (2d ed. 1977); MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE 
CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 13–14 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 
eds., 1927) (“The debts of the corporation are its debts, and only its. They are not the 
individual stockholder’s debts....”). 
85 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-33-
1(b) (West 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-010(2) (West 2013); Allied Ready Mix 
Co. v. Allen, 994 S.W. 2d 4, 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (“Directors rather than shareholders man-
age the business and affairs of a corporation.”); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2010); 
1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS 410 (2d ed. 
2003) (“A corporation’s board of directors is legally the supreme authority in matters of 
the corporation’s regular business management.”); CHARLES B. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 558 (5th ed. 1923). A shareholder’s direct rights 
vis-à-vis control of the corporation are restricted to the periodic election of directors and, 
after board approval, passing upon organic transactions such as merger, sale of substan-
tially all assets outside the ordinary course of business, and amendment of the articles of 
incorporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (West 2013) (election of directors); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-33-3(c) (West 2013) (election of directors); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 271B.8-030(4) (West 2013) (election of directors); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (West 
2013) (mergers); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-40-3(b) (West 2013) (mergers); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 271B.11-030(2) (West 2013) (mergers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (West 2013) 
(sale of assets); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-41-2(b) (West 2013) (sale of assets); KY. REV. STAT. 
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is that of the corporation as a legal entity distinct from the shareholders, 
and those assets are not available to satisfy the personal debts of the share-
holders.86 An individual shareholder is not, as a shareholder, an agent of the 
corporation,87 and neither is the entire body of shareholders.88 A natural 
                                                                                                                         
ANN. § 271B.12-020(2) (West 2013) (sale of assets); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (West 
2013) (amending governing articles); IND. CODE § 23-1-38-3(b) (West 2013) (amending 
governing articles); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.10-030(2) (West 2013) (amending gov-
erning articles); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2010) (election of directors); MOD. BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 11.04(b) (2010) (merger); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.02(b) (2010) (sale of 
assets); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(b) (2010) (amendment of articles). 
86 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.3-020(1) (West 2013) (“[E]very corporation shall 
have perpetual duration and succession in its corporate name and shall have the same powers 
as an individual to ... (d) Purchase, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and own, hold, 
improve, use and otherwise deal with, real or personal property, or any legal or equitable 
interest in property, wherever located ….”); Ark. Iron & Metal Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of 
Rogers, 701 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Ark. App. 1985) (“‘A stockholder does not acquire any 
estate in the property of a corporation by virtue of his stock; the full legal and equitable 
title thereto is in the corporation....’”) (quoting Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 131 S.W. 340, 
344 (Ark. 1910)) (alteration in original)); In re Peoples Bankshares, Ltd., 68 B.R. 536, 539 
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (“Although a debtor owns 100 percent of the stock of a corpora-
tion, the property interest of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate extends only to the intangible 
personal property rights represented by the stock certificates; the technical, legal distinc-
tions between corporations will be respected and applied with reference to the automatic 
stays of actions against property of the estate.”); 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 630 
(2004) (“A stockholder has no right to interfere with the possessory interest of the corpo-
ration in its assets or property” because the corporation, not the shareholders, owns the prop-
erty of the corporation.); WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS 36 (2d ed. 1907). See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.240(1) (West 2013) 
(providing that the property of LLC to be that of the LLC and not of the members); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-501(a) (2013) (“A member is not a co-owner of, and has no trans-
ferable interest in, property of a [LLC].”); VA. CODE § 13.1-1021 (West 2013) (providing 
that an LLC takes title to its property). 
87 See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING 
A CAPITAL STOCK § 709 (5th ed. 1903) (“The stockholders cannot enter into contracts with 
third persons. Contracts between the corporation and third persons must be entered into by 
the directors and not by the stockholders. The corporation, in such matters, is represented 
by the former and not by the latter. Such is one of the main objects of corporate existence. 
To the directors are given the management and formation of corporate contracts. The 
stockholders cannot, in meeting assembled, bind the corporation by their contracts in its 
behalf.”); WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS AND GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW 8 (2d ed. 1889) (“The mere fact that he is a stockholder does not make 
him an agent to contract for it or bind it by his acts.”); FLETCHER, supra note 84, § 30 (“The 
mere fact that one is a shareholder or a majority or principal shareholder gives the individual 
no authority to represent the corporation as its agent in dealing with third persons.”). 
88 See 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 630 (2013).  
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person is permitted to represent himself in court without a requirement to re-
tain legal counsel, but a corporation may appear only through legal counsel; 
it may not be represented by a shareholder—even the sole shareholder.89 A 
shareholder—even a sole shareholder—may not seek personal redress for 
an injury suffered by the corporation.90 A shareholder—even a sole share-
holder—is not a party to the corporation’s contracts.91 
Consider a business corporation in which a single individual is its sole 
shareholder, sole director, and sole officer. It is deceptively easy to think that 
there is an entire unity of interests between that single, natural person com-
prising all three roles and the corporation. Doing so, however, fails to ac-
count for (1) the distinct legal rights of the corporation as a legal person and 
(2) the distinctions among the roles of shareholder, director, and officer. The 
property of the corporation is that of the corporation; it is not the property 
of the shareholder and it is not co-owned by the shareholder.92 The individual 
                                                                                                                         
89 See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 830 (1824) (“A corporation, it is 
true, can appear only by attorney, while a natural person may appear for himself.”); United 
States v. Hagerman, 545 F.3d 579, 581–82 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he right to conduct business 
in a form that confers privileges, such as the limited personal liability of the owners for tort 
or contract claims against the business, carries with it obligations one of which is to hire a 
lawyer if you want to sue or defend on behalf of the entity.”); THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
6 (London, Richard & Edward Atkins, 1702) (“They cannot appear in person, but by 
Attorny [sic].”). The same rule applies with respect to LLCs. See, e.g., Lattanzio v. 
COMTA, 481 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a LLC could appear in federal court 
only through a licensed attorney); In re Shattuck, 411 B.R. 378 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that an individual must be a licensed attorney to appear on behalf of an LLC in 
bankruptcy court). 
90 See, e.g., Kagan v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(“Investors who created the corporate form cannot rend the veil they wove.”); Canderm 
Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharm., Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that an 
action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a stockholder in his or 
her own name, even where the individual is the sole stockholder). See also Turner v. 
Andrew, 413 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Ky. 2013) (holding that sole member of LLC may not in-
dividually pursue a claim for lost business profits; “[A]n LLC is not a legal coat that one 
slips on to protect the owner from liability but then discards or ignores altogether when it 
is time to pursue a damage claim.”). 
91 See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839); Kush v. Am. 
States Ins. Co., 853 F.2d 1380, 1384 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting an effort by a sole share-
holder to enforce an insurance contract entered into by the corporation, “Kush may not 
move freely between corporate and individual status to gain the advantages and avoid the 
disadvantages of the respective forms.”). 
92 See, e.g., Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) (holding that a 
corporation’s shareholders and contracting officers have no rights under the corporation’s 
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will be a director of the corporation if and only if elected to the board of 
directors; there is no default rule to the effect that a shareholder, even a 
sole-shareholder, will be deemed elected a director. The same individual 
will be an officer of the corporation if and only if appointed an officer by 
the board of directors.93 No director or shareholder is by virtue of either posi-
tion an officer of the corporation. As a shareholder the individual may self-
ishly look out for his own interests94 while as a director he or she must look 
out for the best interests of the corporation.95 As an officer he or she is ob-
ligated to look out for the best interests of the corporation while discharging 
the duties imposed by the board of directors.96 The individual, whether a share-
holder, director, or officer, is not a party to the corporation’s obligations, 
and likewise the natural person is not liable for the corporation’s debts and 
obligations.97 There is at law no unity of interests because there are both the 
corporate person and the natural person, each with distinct roles and rights. 
These principles found expression in Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald.98 
McDonald, the sole shareholder of a corporation, sought to bring claims under 
United States Code § 1981 for the refusal by Domino’s Pizza to do business 
with JMW, his corporation.99 The corporation itself brought no § 1981 claim: 
McDonald argues that the statute must be read to give him a cause of 
action because he “made and enforced contracts” for JWM. On his 
reading of the text, “[i]f Domino’s refused to deal with the salesman for 
a pepperoni manufacturer because the salesman was black, that would 
violate the section 1981 right of the salesman to make a contract on be-
half of his principal.” We think not.100 
                                                                                                                         
contracts); Harton v. Johnston, 51 So. 992, 993 (Ala. 1910) (holding that shareholders are 
not tenants-in-common of the corporate assets). 
93 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-400(1) (West 2013) (“A corporation shall 
have the officers described in its bylaws or appointed by the board of directors in accord-
ance with the bylaws.”). 
94 See, e.g., Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376, 381 (Ky. App. 1917) (“A stock-
holder occupies a position and owes a duty radically different from a director. A stock-
holder may in a stockholders’ meeting vote with the view of his own benefit; he represents 
himself only.”). 
95 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(a)(3) (West 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 271B.8-300(1) (West 2013); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2010). 
96 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-420(1)(c) (West 2013); MOD. BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.42(a)(3) (2010). 
97 See supra notes 84, 91. 
98 546 U.S. 470 (2006). 
99 Id. at 472–73. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
100 546 U.S. at 475 (citation omitted). 
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The Court went on to explain that the right to make a contract belongs to the 
principal, and that the principal’s agent is not aggrieved when the contract 
is not made or when it is breached. 
But it is fundamental corporation and agency law—indeed it can be said 
it be the whole purpose of corporation and agency law—that the share-
holders and contracting officer of a corporation has no rights and is ex-
posed to no liability under the corporation’s contracts.101 
The Beckwith Electric Co. v. Sebelius decision misinterpreted the effect 
of incorporation, incorrectly deriving from those decisions that had focused 
on the distinction between the shareholders and corporate activity that, “[t]his 
principled demarcation of obligations and benefits seems to hinge in part 
on the benefit of limited liability gained by the individual in exchange for 
the relinquishment of the right to exercise religion.”102 The point is not that 
“individuals bartered for the privilege of limited personal liability in exchange 
for the relinquishment of their free exercise rights when engaging in com-
merce under the corporate form.”103 Rather, the point is that natural persons 
elected for any of a variety of reasons to with state involvement create a dis-
tinct jural person who would carry on business from which those natural 
persons would have a claim on the residual gain it might realize from its 
activities.104 A shareholder does not assume a “corporate identity”;105 in-
stead, the corporation and the shareholder each have distinct identities.  
The corporation and its shareholders are legally distinct from one an-
other, and the rights and responsibilities of one are not the rights and re-
sponsibilities of the other. Further, there is extreme attenuation between 
                                                                                                                         
101 Id. at 477; see also Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 
2013) (member of LLC lacked standing to present §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985(3) claims for 
alleged injuries to the LLC); Potthoff v. Morin, 245 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
the sole shareholder lacked standing to individually bring a claim for § 1983 violation 
alleged to be suffered by corporation). 
102 Beckwith Electric Co. v. Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 3297498, 
at *9 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2013). 
103 Id. at *10. 
104 See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 38–41 (2012) (positing 
that a shareholder holds only a limited series of contractual rights vis-à-vis the corporation, 
primarily a contingent claim to a pro-rata portion to the residual gains of the venture, and 
that the shareholders are not title owners of the juridic person). 
105 Beckwith, 2013 WL 3297498, at *11 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“[T]he Government may not suppress political 
speech on the basis of speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest 
justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”)). 
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the shareholders and the actions of the corporation occasioned by the inter-
vention of the board’s role in determining policy, the officer’s role in the 
implementation of that policy, and the satisfaction of the debt created out 
of assets belonging to the corporation. 
IV. A BUSINESS ENTITY HAS NO FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS DO NOT DO BUSINESS THROUGH A CORPORATION 
Irrespective of the theory upon which they may proceed, neither a for-
profit business entity106 nor its owners may claim exemption from the 
Mandate based on the Free Exercise Clause. 
A. A Corporation Has Neither a Religion Nor Free Exercise Rights 
The maintenance of religious beliefs and conduct arising therefrom are 
a necessary precondition to the benefit of protections under the Free Exer-
cise Clause.107 Because a corporation itself has no religion, it has no Free 
Exercise protections. 
For certain purposes, a corporation is treated as a “person” benefiting 
from constitutional protections, but those protections are afforded on a case-
by-case basis.108 For example, a corporation may be a “person” with a de-
fined citizenship who may access the federal courts by means of diversity 
jurisdiction.109 It benefits from due process110 and equal protection of the 
law,111 may exercise the rights of a free press,112 and enjoys protections 
against unreasonable search and seizure of its property.113 Conversely, a cor-
poration has no Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination114 and its 
                                                                                                                         
106 This statement should not be read as a concession that a non-profit corporation is 
able to exercise Free Exercise rights. See supra note 8. 
107 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
108 See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287 (W.D. Okla. 
2012) (“Corporations have constitutional rights in some circumstances, such as the right to 
free speech, but the rights of corporate persons and natural persons are not coextensive.”). 
109 E.g., Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). 
110 Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889) (“It is contended 
by counsel as the basis of his argument, and we admit the soundness of his position, that 
corporations are persons within the meaning of the [14th Amendment, § 1].”). 
111 See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). 
112 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286–88 (1964); Grosjean v. Am. 
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). 
113 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). 
114 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944); see also Strategic Def. Int’l, Inc. 
v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1234–35 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that a cor-
poration has no right to testify on its own behalf). 
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due process rights are restricted as compared to those of natural persons.115 A 
First Amendment right to petition the government exists116 and a corporate 
expenditure with respect to an election may not be restricted on the basis of 
its corporate form,117 but political contributions by that same corporation may 
be restricted.118 A corporation has no right to vote, hold elected office, or sit 
on a jury.119 A corporation is not a person for determining the allocation of 
seats among the states in the House of Representatives.120 An indigent cor-
poration is not entitled to state-appointed legal counsel.121 
It is axiomatic that the Free Exercise Clause protects religious beliefs and 
conduct based thereon; absent religious belief the Free Exercise Clause is 
without application.122 Although a number of courts have recently avoided 
                                                                                                                         
115 Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 252, 255 (1906). 
116 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789–92 (1978). 
117 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010); see also 
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980). 
118 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314–15. 
119 The author admits his inability to find authority for this proposition, likely because 
nobody has argued a corporation has these rights. See also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
394 (Steven, J., dissenting) (“In the context of election to public office, the distinction 
between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they made enormous con-
tributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or 
run for office.”). 
120 Although section 2 of the 14th Amendment provides that Representatives shall be 
allocated among the states “counting the whole number of persons in each State,” it appears 
that no court has been called upon to address the question of whether a “person” includes 
a “corporation” for these purposes. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
121 See United States v. Chaudary, No. 12-20123-CM, 2012 WL 5877414, at *2 (D. 
Kan. Oct. 30, 2012); United States v. Golden Heart In Home Care LLC, No. 2:12-cr-00062, 
2012 WL 3580194, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 17, 2012); United States v. Johnson, No. CRIM. 
A. 98-276, 1999 WL 569528, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 1999). In addition, a corporation is 
not a “person” for purposes of the car pool lane. Mark Gibbs, Are Corporations People in 
the Carpool Lane?, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2013, 11:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mark 
gibbs/2013/01/07/are-corporations-people-in-the-carpool-lane/. A corporation cannot be licensed 
to practice a profession. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Newburg Chiropractic, 
P.S.C., 683 F. Supp. 2d 502, 510 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (citing 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7.05 (Perm. ed. 1999)). See also FCC v. AT&T, 
131 S. Ct. 1177, 1178 (2011) (corporate information is not subject to the personal privacy 
exemption of § 7(C) of the Freedom of Information Act). 
122 See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (“There is 
no doubt that ‘[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause.’ 
Purely secular views do not suffice.”) (citations omitted); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 215 (1972) (“[T]o have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be 
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the question of whether the Free Exercise Clause is applicable to corporations 
and other business entities,123 a substantial number of courts have held that 
corporations and other business entities lack Free Exercise protections. For 
example, in Atlantic Department Store, Inc. v. State’s Attorney for Prince 
George’s County,124 the court responded to the assertion that a Sunday clos-
ing law infringed upon a corporation’s Free Exercise rights, observing that, 
“[a]s artificial, not natural, persons [corporations] have neither religion nor 
non-religion, in the free exercise of which the First Amendment protects 
individuals.”125 In Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, Inc.,126 the Court 
noted that “[t]he history of the free-exercise clause indicates that it is a purely 
personal guarantee,”127 and in considering whether a business corporation has 
Free Exercise rights the Court wrote: 
Certain “purely personal” guarantees, such as the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other orga-
nizations because the “historic function” of the particular guarantee has 
                                                                                                                         
rooted in religious belief.”); id. at 216 (holding that choices that are “philosophical and 
personal rather than religious” are not within the scope of the Religion Clauses); Snyder 
v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)) (“The first questions in any free exercise claim are whether the 
plaintiff’s beliefs are religious in nature, and whether those religious beliefs are sincerely 
held.”); id. (“Only beliefs which are religious in nature are protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause.”); Ochs v. Thalacker, 90 F.3d 293, 296 (8th Cir. 1996); Fiedler v. Marumsco 
Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 1144, 1151 (4th Cir. 1980). 
123 See, e.g., Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 (S.D. Ind. 2012) 
(declining to address the availability of Free Exercise rights in Grote Industries by finding 
an absence of “substantial burden” on those rights were they to exist); O’Brien v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1158 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (raising 
but declining “to reach the question of whether a secular limited liability company is 
capable of exercising a religion within the meaning of RFRA or the First Amendment”); 
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1295 (D. Colo. 2012) (referring to the question 
of a corporation’s Free Exercise rights as one of first impression). 
124 323 A.2d 617 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974). 
125 Id. at 622. It bears recognizing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), holding that a Sunday closing law did not violate the Free 
Exercise rights of orthodox Jews who closed their retail stores on Saturday, did not require 
the court to consider an assertion of corporate rights. Rather, as made clear by the caption 
and style of the trial court ruling, the plaintiffs were individuals and not corporations. See 
Braunfeld v. Gibbons, 184 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Pa. 1959). 
126 373 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. App. 1985). 
127 Id. at 789 n.1. 
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been limited to the protection of individuals. Whether or not a particular 
guarantee is “purely personal” or is unavailable to corporations for some 
other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular 
constitutional provision.128 
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,129 the Supreme Court 
described the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause as “to secure religious liberty 
in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority.”130 
Numerous courts addressing Mandate challenges have correctly followed 
this line of cases in holding that corporations have no Free Exercise rights.131 
                                                                                                                         
128 Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978); see 
also Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1469, 1476 
n.35 (2012) (“It is also odd to discuss the religious conscience of an organization.... People 
have consciences; they can feel indignity, shame, or remorse. Institutions do not.”); Caroline 
Mala Corbin, Debate, The Contraception Mandate and Religious Freedom, Rebuttal, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 261, 269 (2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa  
-L-Rev-Online-261.pdf (“When an individual says, this act burdens my Catholic conscience, 
we clearly know whose conscience is at issue. But when an institution says, this act burdens 
our Catholic conscience, that clarity is lacking. Is it the institution’s conscience? If so, do 
institutions even have a conscience in the way that real people do?”). 
129 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
130 Id. at 223 (emphasis added); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[C]orporations have no consciences, no be-
liefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.”). Religion, Madison observed, “is a duty which 
we owe to our CREATOR.” See JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON DIGITAL 
EDITION, 175 (J. C. A. Stagg, ed. Univ. of Va. Press, Rotunda) (2010), available at http:// 
rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/JSMN-01-01-02-0054-0004 (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
Corporations are created by state and occasionally the federal governments. 
131 See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 701 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) 
(“A corporation is a legal construct which does not have the sentence and conscience to 
entertain such ultimate questions.”); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 
F. Supp. 2d 394, 409 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 
134 S. Ct. 678 (U.S. 2013); Mersino Mgmt. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-11296, 2013 WL 
3546702, at *9 (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2013); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-1096, 
2012 WL 6845677, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012); Order Denying Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, MK Chambers Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-11379, 
2013 WL 5182435, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2013) (“Religious belief takes shape within 
the minds and hearts of individuals, and its protection is one of the more uniquely human 
rights provided by the Constitution.”); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 632 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (following Autocam and holding that a corporation has neither Free Exercise 
nor RFRA rights); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1214 
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Free Exercise falls within the group of constitutional rights not afforded to 
corporations, not out of prejudice against corporations, but rather in recogni-
tion that the right would protect a null set. Being only creatures of positive 
law with defined and limited powers, corporations lack a spiritual element;132 
as it has been observed numerous times, “a corporation has no soul.”133 
                                                                                                                         
(D.D.C. 2013) (noting while religious corporations may have Free Exercise rights, non-
religious corporations, which Freshway conceded itself to be, have no such rights.). 
132 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (“Whether 
or not a particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations for some 
other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional 
provision.”). To date the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether a corpora-
tion itself exercises religious rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause. See Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.) (“This Court has not 
previously addressed similar [religious freedom] or free exercise claims brought by closely 
held for-profit corporations and their controlling shareholders alleging that the mandatory 
provision of certain employee benefits substantially burdens their exercise of religion.”). 
Curiously, despite this statement, the Tenth Circuit subsequently ruled in Hobby Lobby: 
In addition, the Supreme Court has affirmed the RFRA rights of corporate 
claimants, notwithstanding the claimants’ decision to use the corporate form. 
See O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 
973, 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (affirming a RFRA claim brought by “a 
New Mexico corporation on its own behalf”), aff’d, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S. 
Ct. 1211, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (2006). 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. 
Ct. 678 (2013). It is at best difficult to reconcile this statement with that of Justice Sotomayor. 
At its first opportunity, the Supreme Court should hold that a corporation or other legal en-
tity of itself has no Free Exercise rights. 
133 See, e.g., Tipling v. Pexall, 2 Bulst. 233 (1613) (“The opinion of Manwood, Chief 
Baron, was this, as touching corporations: that they are invisible, immortal, and that they 
have no soul. A corporation is a body aggregate; none can create souls but God: but the 
King creates them, and therefore they have no souls.”); Sutton’s Hospital, 10 Coke’s Rep. 
1, 32 (1613) (“A corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in 
intendment and consideration of law. They can’t commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor 
excommunicated, for they have no souls, neither can they appear in person, but only by 
attorney.”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 477 
(3d ed. 2003) (“Neither can a corporation be excommunicated; for it has no soul....”); 1 
JOHN POYNDER, LITERARY EXTRACTS FROM ENGLISH AND OTHER WORKS 268 (1844) 
(“Corporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned; they 
therefore do as they like.”); Arthur W. Mechen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. 
REV. 253, 253 (1911) (“From the earliest period of our judicial history, lawyers and 
judges have reiterated the doctrine that a corporation is an intangible legal entity, without 
body and without soul.”). 
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The assertion the Mandate violates a corporation’s Free Exercise rights 
falls for the simple reason that a corporation has no religion and therefore 
no Free Exercise rights with respect thereto. 
B. The Religions at Issue in the Challenges to the Mandate Do Not 
Provide for the Corporate Practice of Religion 
The question “what is a religion?” is one the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged exists,134 but has studiously avoided answering. Given the 
breadth of world religions, any attempt at a comprehensive definition 
undoubtedly would be flawed for being, at minimum, under-inclusive. The 
three world religions tracing themselves to Abraham135 accept a monothe-
istic deity as a matter of dogma, but this characteristic is lacking from 
Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism.136 Dualist and gnostic expres-
sions of Abrahamic faiths also have lacked a single divinity.137 Modern 
synergistic faiths such as Baha’i and Cao Dai present additional challenges 
to a comprehensive definition,138 and the status of Xenu is beyond the scope 
of this Article.139 
                                                                                                                         
134 See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 183 (1965) (“We recognize the difficul-
ties that have always faced the trier of fact in [cases that require defining religious belief.]”). 
135 Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
136 KENNETH BOA, CULTS, WORLD RELIGIONS AND THE OCCULT 16 (1990) (contrasting 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism with monotheistic belief systems). 
137 For example, the Albigenses of southern France appear to have been dualist, as were 
their possible predecessors, the Bogomils. 1 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 267–68 (Charles 
G. Herbermann et al. eds., 1907). At least the followers of the second century heretic Marcion 
were also dualist. See 9 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 645 (Charles G. Herbermann et 
al. eds., 1910). 
138 See 1 RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD: A COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BELIEFS 
AND PRACTICES 260, 264 (J. Gordon Melton & Martin Baumann eds., 2d ed. 2010) (de-
scribing how many famous religious figures from other religions, such as Jesus and 
Muhammad, are considered “Manifestations of God”); 2 RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD: A 
COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 502 (J. Gordon Melton & 
Martin Baumann eds., 2d ed. 2010) (discussing how Caodaism attempts to unite all other 
world religions).  
139 According to some, Xenu was the dictator of the “Galactic Confederacy” which 
brought billions of people to Earth seventy-five million years ago and killed them by det-
onating hydrogen bombs in the volcanoes around which the people were distributed. In the 
view of Scientology, the lingering spirits of these people cause the adversity affecting var-
ious people to this day. Knowledge of Xenu is supposed to be restricted to higher-level 
Scientology adherents, and it is said that those who attempt to bypass the prerequisite 
levels will come down with pneumonia. HUGH B. URBAN, THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY 
103 (2011). The author does not want to get pneumonia. 
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The term “religion” in the Free Exercise Clause need not, however, be de-
fined in order to determine whether a corporation itself has a Free Exercise 
right. Rather, that determination can be made through a third-party assess-
ment of the religion of the individual shareholders of the business entities 
challenging the Mandate. As such, the question is not whether a corporation 
may exercise “a” religion, but rather whether a corporation may exercise 
“the” religion espoused by the shareholders of the corporation alleging, inter 
alia, that satisfying the Mandate’s requirement would violate the corporation’s 
religious beliefs. If the religion would not accept a corporation as a member, 
then it follows that the corporation has no Free Exercise protected rights 
within that faith. 
Such limited investigation into religious structure is permissible in that 
some degree of due diligence is necessary to determine whether Free Exercise 
rights are at issue.140 For example, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & School v. EEOC,141 the Supreme Court looked to the title of the 
employee at issue—“Minister of Religion, Commissioned”—and the pre-
requisites of that title—namely “a significant degree of religious training 
followed by a formal process of commissioning”142—to determine that the 
ministerial exemption was applicable.143 
                                                                                                                         
140 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
141 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
142 Id. at 707. In the Lutheran faith, a “commissioned minister” is a formal church of-
ficer traceable to the earliest days of Lutheranism. See THE AUGSBURG CONFESSION 22 
(Charles P. Krauth trans., 1868) (“[N]o man should publicly teach in the Church, or ad-
minister the Sacraments, except he be rightly called….”); see also Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 
462 F.3d 294, 307 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that the plaintiff performed a “ministerial” 
function); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 
2000) (“Where no spiritual function is involved, the First Amendment does not stay the 
application of a generally applicable law such as Title VII to the religious employer 
unless Congress so provides. Our inquiry thus focuses on ‘the function of the position’ at 
issue and not on categorical notions of who is or is not a ‘minister.’” (citation omitted)); Penn 
v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., No. 11-cv-9137 (NSR), 2013 WL 5477600 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 
2013) (no ministerial exemption where hospital was not a religious institution). 
143 To provide but one additional example of the courts investigating the internal func-
tioning of a religious body, the so-called “Parsonage Exemption” of the Internal Revenue 
Code necessitates investigation into who constitutes a “minister of the gospel.” See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (2002) (providing exemptions from gross income “[i]n the case of a min-
ister of the gospel”); Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5(a) (1997) (defining “minister” for the pur-
pose of certain tax benefits); Haimowitz v. Comm’r, 1997 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 97,039,  ¶ 97,041 
(1997) (finding that a synagogue administrator was not a “minister” because he did not 
perform religious rights and ceremonies); Silverman v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 727, 731–32 
(1972) (finding that a Jewish cantor employed full-time by a synagogue was a “minister” 
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Corporations do not partake in religious services, offer prayers, or re-
ceive sacraments.144 A corporation cannot be baptized because it lacks a 
body upon which the water can flow or in which it can be immersed.145 
Issues of transubstantiation versus symbolic memorial versus symbolic par-
allel versus symbolic instrumentality have no bearing upon a corporation;146 
a corporation cannot partake in the sacrament to which these disputes relate. 
A corporation cannot be confirmed.147 A priest will administer last rights to 
and counsel a prisoner in anticipation of execution;148 similar rituals are not 
performed upon the dissolution of a corporation. Likewise, a corporation 
                                                                                                                         
for tax purposes because he performed religious worship, sacerdotal training, and educa-
tional functions as specified by Jewish religious tenets); Lawrence v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 
494, 499–500 (1968) (finding that a commissioned but not ordained Baptist minister of edu-
cation was not a “minister” because he was unable to officiate at baptisms, preside over or 
preach at worship services, or take part in other aspects of Baptist services); Congregation 
Ahavath Torah v. Englewood City, 21 N.J. Tax 318, 323 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2004) (“Instead, as 
with other members of the clergy, the character and extent of an individual’s activities 
within the congregation will determine if the Parsonage Exemption applies.”); Ministers 
Audit Techniques Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 5 (2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs 
-utl/ministers.pdf (“The duties performed by the individual are also important to the initial 
determination whether he or she is a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister. 
Because religious disciplines vary in their formal procedures for these designations, whether 
an individual is ‘duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed’ depends on these facts and 
circumstances.”). The Parsonage Exemption was recently held to be unconstitutional as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, No. 11-
cv-626-bbc, 2013 WL 6139723, at *21 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 22, 2013). 
144 The following points are made against the sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church 
because most of the objections to the Mandate have been brought by members of that faith. 
See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Complaint 
¶ 3, SMA, LLC v. Sebelius, No. 0:13-cv-01375 (D. Minn. June 7, 2013); Complaint ¶ 15, 
Johnson Welded Prods., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00609-ESH (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2013). 
145 See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 317, ¶ 1239 (revised ed. 1994) 
(“Baptism is performed in the most expressive way by triple immersion in the baptismal 
water. However, from ancient times it has also been … conferred by pouring the water 
three times over the candidate’s head.”). 
146 See, e.g., id. at 334 (describing the symbolic and spiritual significance behind the 
Eucharist). 
147 See 2 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 329 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds., 
1907) (“The essential rite of the sacrament follows. In the Latin rite, ‘the sacrament of 
Confirmation is conferred through the anointing with chrism on the forehead, which is done 
by the laying on of the hand, and through the words: ‘Accipe signaculum doni Spiritus 
Sancti’ [Be sealed with the Gift of the Holy Spirit.].”). 
148 See, e.g., Letter from Paul A. Beighley, Contract Chaplain, Greensville Correctional 
Center, to Editor, in VA. ADVOC. (July 2002), available at http://www.prisontalk.com/forums 
/archive/index.php/t-2541.html. 
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has no head or other extremities to which the holy oil used in the sacrament 
of extreme unction could be applied.149 
The various individual plaintiffs assert, inter alia, that the corporation 
somehow expresses their religious views.150 Such claims must fail as a basis 
for creating a religious identity in the business entity when the religion iden-
tified as the source of the objections to the Mandate will not accept the 
entity as a member. 
C. Ab Initio Lacking Free Exercise Rights, A Corporation Has No Rights 
Under the RFRA 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)151 was enacted in re-
sponse to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith.152 The RFRA imposes upon the federal 
government153 a strict scrutiny standard with respect to assertions that Free 
Exercise rights are being burdened.154 To that end, if a federal statute—even 
one of neutral and general application—imposes a substantial burden upon 
a person’s Free Exercise rights, the government must show that the statute 
is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.155 
Although there has not yet been a determinative ruling on the point, the 
“person” protected under the RFRA must be a natural person; a corporation 
or legal entity created by state action does not exercise any religion or have 
any Free Exercise rights of and for itself, and such rights are a precondition 
                                                                                                                         
149 See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 145, at 380 (explain-
ing that the sacrament of “Anointing of the Sick” involves the priest “lay[ing] hands on the 
sick”); 5 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 716 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds, 1907) 
(“[T]he sacrament [of extreme unction] consists … in the unction with oil, specially 
blessed by the bishop, of the organs of the five external senses (eyes, ears, nostrils, lips, 
hands), of the feet and, for men ..., of the loins or reins ....”). 
150 E.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (W.D. 
Okla. 2012). 
151 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (1993). 
152 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (applying rational basis scrutiny to Free Exercise chal-
lenges to neutral laws of general application and holding that the Free Exercise Clause 
does not “relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of 
general applicability” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
153 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the RFRA does not 
apply to state and local governments, and that in enacting RFRA pursuant to section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress lacked the authority to expand rights protected by 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
154 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (1993). 
155 Id. 
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to the RFRA’s application. The RFRA refers to a “person” without defining 
the term.156  The Dictionary Act157 defines “person” to include a “corporation,” 
and this language has been blindly relied upon by some plaintiffs challenging 
the Mandate.158 This path in no manner supports the position that Congress 
contemplated that a corporation has Free Exercise rights or that in fact such 
rights do exist. Rather, further scrutiny is necessary to determine whether 
the application of the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” and the inclu-
sion of corporations are appropriate.159 The government may not substantially 
“burden a person’s exercise of religion;”160 there must first be an ability to 
“exercise” religion before it can be burdened.161 The question is not whether 
                                                                                                                         
156 Id. 
157 1 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2013). 
158 See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1211 
(D.D.C. 2013) (“The Freshway companies largely depend on the Dictionary Act’s elision of 
the differences in identity, hoping it applies to their RFRA claim.”); Oral Argument at 37:05, 
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013), available at http://media.ca7.uscourts .gov 
/sound/2013/lj.12-3841.12-3841_05_22_2013.mp3 (“When Congress passed RFRA it knew 
what it was drafting. It drafted it to say person. It did not give any exemption.”); Oral 
Argument at 6:05, Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 2013), available at http://media 
.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2013/lj.13-1077.13-1077_05_22_2013.mp3 (“So when RFRA pro-
tects any exercise of religion for a person, which the Dictionary Act says is corporations....”). 
159 The Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” is qualified by “unless the context in-
dicates otherwise.” 1 U.S.C.A. § 1. See, e.g., Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194 
(1993) (holding that a corporation is not a “person” within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 
and therefore is unable to proceed in forma pauperis); United States v. Havelock, 619 F.3d 
1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing a conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) where threat-
ening communication was addressed to a corporation, reasoning that “person” in § 876(c) is 
restricted to natural persons, notwithstanding the Dictionary Act); Isaacson v. Dow Chem. 
Co., 517 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that inclusion of “corporation” within “person” is 
a rebuttable presumption based upon the legislative history of the statute at issue); Adams v. 
United States, 420 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that, notwithstanding the Dictionary 
Act, a corporation is not a person for purposes of tort immunity provided by the Federal Tort 
Claims Act); see also United States v. Hilton, 701 F.3d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Dic-
tionary Act further complicates this inquiry by treating the word ‘individual’ as a subset of 
the term ‘person.’ By making this distinction with regard to those two words, the Dictionary 
Act suggests that the two words are not synonymous.”). In Holy Land Foundation for Relief 
and Development v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002), the district court deter-
mined that the Foundation was not a “person” afforded RFRA protections. Id. at 83. The 
appeals court avoided the issue, holding that irrespective of whether RFRA applied, no 
burden existed. Holy Land Found. Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 
2004), aff’g 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002). 
160 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (1993). 
161 Some of the corporate plaintiffs challenging the Mandate have sought to highlight 
their “religious” character by pointing to observance of religious holidays, provisions for 
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a corporation is a RFRA “person,” but rather is a corporation a RFRA person 
                                                                                                                         
employee spiritual health, corporate policy statements, and charitable contributions. E.g., 
Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738 n.5 (S.D. Ill. 2012) 
(“In furtherance of their Catholic faith, the Kortes both strongly support, financially and other-
wise, Catholic fundraisers and other events, including, but not limited to, the STYDEC Ghana 
Project, restoration of their parish church, annual church picnic, and annual parish school 
auction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Complaint ¶ 42, Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, 
914 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (No. 4:12-cv-00134-SEB-DML) (“Under the Grote 
family’s direction, Grote Industries has donated significant amounts to Catholic parishes, 
schools, evangelical efforts, and charitable causes averaging approximately $98,000 every 
year since 2007. This practice has been in place for many years prior to 2007.”); Complaint 
¶ 6, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. 5:12-
cv-01000-HE) (“They give millions of dollars from their profits to fund missionaries and 
ministries around the world.”); id. ¶ 43 (“[T]he stores use a carefully managed music play-
list which prominently features inspirational Christian songs.”); id. ¶ 47 (describing news-
paper advertisements taken out around Christmas and Easter, “celebrat[ing] the religious 
nature of the holidays”); Complaint ¶ 27, Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. 
Mich. 2012) (No. 2:12CV15488) (“Some of the amenities and services Plaintiff Domino’s 
Farms offers to its tenants include an on-site Catholic chapel ... and Catholic bookstore.”); 
id. ¶ 28 (“The on-site chapel offers Mass four times daily and twenty three [sic] times a 
week.”); id. ¶ 30 (“Plaintiff Domino’s Farms food services offer healthy menu options, as 
well as providing Catholic menu options such as fish during the Fridays of lent.”).  
Still, they are not ab initio religious corporations. For example, upon the publicly avail-
able record of Hobby Lobby, there is nothing particularly “religious” about the organiza-
tion. For example, the Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation filed by the 
Oklahoma Secretary of State on February 29, 1996, sets forth the purpose of the corporation 
as “to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the 
general corporation law of the State of Oklahoma.” The Amended and Restated Certificate 
of Incorporation filed by the Oklahoma Secretary of State on March 31, 1994, repeated the 
language of the original certificate filed November 28, 1997, setting forth the purpose of the 
corporation in fifteen distinct paragraphs, none of which referenced religious belief or the 
Catholic faith, but which did include: the capacity to operate truck lines and other transpor-
tation facilities, to borrow money, to deal in royalties and other interests in minerals, and to 
own or lease mines and mineral lands. The Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation 
of Autocam Corporation filed with the Michigan Secretary of State on August 31, 2009, de-
scribe the purpose of the corporation “as any activity within the purposes for which corpo-
rations may be organized under the Business Corporation Act of Michigan.” While Annex 
Medical has asserted through its attorney that it has a “faith based charter,” see Christopher 
Snowbeck, Minnetonka Firm Argues Against Contraceptive Coverage Mandate, TWINCITIES 
.COM (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_24380287/minnetonka-firm 
-argues-against-contraceptive-coverage-mandate, that entity’s articles of incorporation are 
silent as to any religious element and provide in part that “the purposes of the corporation 
are general business purposes.” Absent a holding that at least a for-profit business entity 
does not have of itself Free Exercise rights, the courts are going to find themselves in a 
morass of determining whether a particular entity is behaving in a sufficiently religious way 
to warrant Free Exercise rights and consequent rights under RFRA. 
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exercising religion.162  Because corporations themselves have no religion, they 
have no protection against the infringement thereof based on the RFRA.163 
The RFRA’s allocation of burden in determining the legality of an as-
serted infringement of rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause does 
nothing to create a right protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Although 
the RFRA may protect a “person’s” Free Exercise rights, it cannot create in 
a “person,” however defined, Free Exercise rights.164 Ab initio lacking Free 
Exercise rights that could be protected by the RFRA, the RFRA has no ap-
plication to business entities.165 
D. The Corporation is Not a Nominee Through Which the Shareholders 
Engage in Business 
The suggestion that the shareholders carry on business through a corpo-
ration is untenable. A corporation—i.e. a legal person—conducts business 
for itself and on its own account; it does not conduct the business of the 
shareholders, who are distinct persons.166 The corporation is not an agent 
                                                                                                                         
162 It was the failure to recognize this two-part analysis that led to the failure of the 
majority decision in Korte. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013). There the Court 
held that “[t]he corporate plaintiffs are ‘persons’ under RFRA and may invoke the statute’s 
protections.” Id. at 666. See also id. at 675 (“[W]e take it as both conceded and noncontro-
versial that the use of the corporate form ... do not disable an organization from engaging in 
the exercise of religion within the meaning of RFRA (or the Free Exercise Clause, for that 
matter).”). It then strained to find authority for Free Exercise by corporate entities, pointedly 
ignoring the cases that have clearly held to the contrary (see supra notes 124–30 and ac-
companying text). Still it never linked the religious exercise/belief element to the corporate 
form and never explaining how a corporation can have a religious view that is protected by 
RFRA from a burden, facts recognized by Judge Rovner in her dissent. 735 F.3d at 694–95 
(Rovner, J., dissenting). 
163 See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. 
Pa. 2013) (determination that a corporation has no Free Exercise rights compels the con-
clusion of no rights under RFRA), aff’d, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 
S. Ct. 678 (2013). But see Beckwith Electric Co., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-
17MAP, 2013 WL 3297498, at *8 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2013) (“While the issue is a close 
one, the Court concludes that a corporation is a ‘person’ under the First Amendment and 
the RFRA.”). 
164 By way of analogy, Congress could not extend the protections afforded by the Free 
Exercise Clause to purely philosophical or moral views that are not based upon a religious 
faith. See supra note 122. 
165 See also Gilardi v. Sebelius, 926 F. Supp. 2d 273, 279 n.3 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Because 
the Court finds that the Freshway Corporations do not exercise religion, the Court does not 
reach the question of whether they are ‘persons’ within the scope of RFRA.”). 
166 This rule can be traced back to the Roman Civitas, the forerunner of today’s corpo-
ration. See RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES 190, § 37 (James Crawford Ledlie trans., 3d 
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acting on behalf of the shareholders; were that the case, then the share-
holders would be personally responsible for all the debts and obligations 
incurred by the corporation on behalf of its principals, and the corporation 
would not be liable thereon.167 
It bears repeating that it is not the shareholders who direct and manage 
the corporation, but rather the Board of Directors with its decisions being 
implemented by the corporate officers.168 The Board, not the shareholders, 
determines corporate policy.169 That the Board may be comprised of all or 
some subset of the persons who are the shareholders does not alter the fact 
that the positions are legally distinct.170 
In several of the Mandate cases to date, the question of whether the 
corporation has standing to object to the Mandate has been avoided by per-
mitting the corporation to represent, in effect, the interests of the various 
shareholders.171 Proceeding on this basis has not yet been justified. On ex-
amination, it should be rejected, and the facts of the Mandate cases demon-
strate that it is inapplicable ab initio. 
The Supreme Court set forth the test for representational standing in 
Powers v. Ohio,172 there addressing whether a criminal defendant may 
                                                                                                                         
ed. 1907) (“Rights and liabilities of a corporation do not mean joint rights and joint liabil-
ities of the members, but sole rights and sole liabilities of another person, an invisible, a 
juristic person, namely, the corpus.”). 
167 See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006); see also Moline 
Props., Inc. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436, 440 (1943). 
168 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
169 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 220 (1933) (explaining the basic relationship between a Board 
of Directors and the shareholders). 
170 In the instance of Hobby Lobby, the company behind the eponymous case, the cor-
poration is even further removed from the position of those natural persons whose religious 
beliefs give rise to the objection to the Mandate. At least the voting stock of the corporation, 
which presumably holds the exclusive right to elect the Board of Directors, is not owned by 
the members of the Green family, but rather by a trust of which they are beneficiaries. See 
Complaint ¶ 38, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 
2012) (No. 5:12-cv-01000-HE). 
171 See, e.g., Tyndale House Publishers v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 (D.D.C. 
2012) (“This Court, like others before it, declines to address the unresolved question of 
whether for-profit corporations can exercise religion within the meaning of the RFRA and 
the Free Exercise Clause. Instead, the Court will assess whether Tyndale has standing to 
assert the free exercise rights of its owners.” (citations omitted)); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 
F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“For purposes of the pending motion, however, 
Weingartz Supply Co. may exercise standing in order to assert the free exercise rights of 
its president, Daniel Weingartz, being identified as ‘his company.’” (citation omitted)). 
172 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
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assert the Equal Protection rights of those discharged from a petit jury by 
means of preemptory challenges. Relying upon Singleton v. Wulff,173 the 
Court allowed such representational standing: 
[P]rovided three important criteria are satisfied: The litigant must have 
suffered an “injury in fact,” thus giving him or her a “sufficiently con-
crete interest” in the outcome of the issue in dispute, the litigant must 
have a close relation to the third party, and there must exist some hin-
drance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.174 
The present disputes are entirely unlike the question addressed in Powers, 
namely the vindication of the rights of those wrongly excluded from jury 
duty. Allowing the criminal defendant to litigate those claims provided an 
effective voice for the dismissed potential jurors, who faced “considerable 
practical [financial] barriers to suit” and had “little incentive to set in motion 
the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights.”175 The Mandate 
cases are curious in that both the business entities and their owners are pres-
ent before the courts; it cannot be said that one or the other needs to protect 
the interests of an absent person.176 With all of the purportedly burdened 
parties present and able to vindicate the asserted wrong, the third element of 
representational standing is not satisfied. Ergo, there is no basis for repre-
sentational standing under Powers. 
In Korte v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,177 the court 
permitted the corporation to proceed on the basis that it represented the 
                                                                                                                         
173 428 U.S. 106 (1976). 
174 Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (citations omitted); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple 
Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (requiring for representational standing that 
the entity otherwise have standing to bring suit on its member’s behalf, that the interest to 
be protected be germane to the organization’s purposes, and that there be no need for the 
member’s participation). 
175 Powers, 499 U.S. at 415. 
176 E.g., O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 
1154 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (identifying the plaintiffs as O’Brien Industrial Holding, LLC, and 
Frank R. O’Brien, Jr.); Complaint, Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-11229, 2013 WL 
1190001 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2013) (No. 2:13-cv-11229-DPH-MAR) (identifying the 
plaintiffs as Eden Foods, Inc., and Michael Potter, its sole shareholder); Complaint at ¶ 2, 
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-1123) (listing 
as plaintiffs the individual owners of Hercules Industries, Inc.); Complaint, Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 5:12-cv-06744-
MSG) (listing as plaintiffs Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., Norman Hahn, Norman 
Lemar Hahn, and Anthony H. Hahn), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
177 Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ill. 2012). 
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religious beliefs of the shareholders, citing without discussion NAACP v. 
Button.178 In Button, the NAACP challenged a Virginia law dealing with the 
ethical rules governing attorneys that had a limiting effect on the NAACP’s 
advocacy rule. The Virginia law was struck down on the basis that it violated 
the associational rights of NAACP members.179 Nothing about this decision, 
which relates to corporate representation of the associational rights of those 
acting through the corporate entity, the corporation as well enjoying asso-
ciational rights, has bearing upon a corporation’s associational representa-
tion of its shareholder’s personal Free Exercise rights, which the corporation 
cannot exercise on its own account. 
Further, under Powers, even where representational standing is possible, 
the representative must vindicate a right of the absent party; it is not the right 
of the representative that is protected but that of the represented.180 It neces-
sarily follows that if the represented has no right that has been violated, then 
there is no redress for the representative to pursue. There is no aggregation 
or increase in net rights by reason of the representation. The party undertak-
ing the representation, for itself, has no greater rights than it would absent the 
representation, and the represented party has no greater rights than would 
be enjoyed absent the representation. 
Several of the plaintiffs have relied on one or both of a pair of decisions 
from the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that a corporation, even a secu-
lar, for-profit corporation, may represent the Free Exercise rights of the 
corporation’s shareholders.181 This reliance is unjustified. Both Townley 
Engineering & Manufacturing Co. and Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky failed (1) to 
set forth an analytic basis for the corporation to represent its shareholders’ 
rights or (2) to explain why proceeding on that ground was preferable to 
simply requiring the shareholders to proceed individually. These failings 
have been repeated in Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, Legatus 
v. Sebelius, and similar cases.182 These rulings are simply too thin a basis 
                                                                                                                         
178 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
179 Id. at 428–29. 
180 Powers, 499 U.S. at 401. 
181 See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Intervenors argue 
that Stormans, a for-profit corporation, lacks standing to assert a claim under the Free 
Exercise Clause. We decline to decide whether a for-profit corporation can assert its own 
rights under the Free Exercise Clause and instead exercise the rights at issue as those of the 
corporate owners.”); id. at 1120 (“[A] corporation has standing to assert the free exercise right 
of its owners.”); EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 620 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(“Townley presents no rights of its own different from or greater than its owners’ rights.”). 
182 Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 118 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(“Tyndale has standing to assert its owners’ free exercise rights under the third-party standing 
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for the supposition that a secular corporation may assert its shareholders’ 
religious rights, especially as these rulings do not address the gulf between 
the corporate person and its shareholders.183 
It is not contested that individuals may associate together, including in 
the corporate form, to collectively exercise their Free Exercise rights. It does 
not, however, follow that a for-profit venture may itself enjoy Free Exercise 
rights. In the former instance, people voluntarily associate for the purpose of 
religious activities, and an individual dissatisfied with the dictates of a reli-
gious faith is not compelled to remain in and be bound thereby. In the latter 
instance, people join the for-profit venture as shareholders, directors, offi-
cers, and employees for any of a variety of reasons. Each has not necessarily 
joined in order to participate in a “religious mission” imposed, or sought to 
be imposed, upon the venture by some constituent body thereof.184 
                                                                                                                         
doctrine....”); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“For the 
purposes of the pending motion, however, Weingartz Supply Co. may exercise standing in 
order to assert the free exercise rights of its president, Daniel Weingartz, being identified as 
‘his company.’” (citation omitted)); Beckwith Elec. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-
17MAP, 2013 WL 3297498, at *12 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2013). 
183 The Third Circuit rejected an effort to utilize the reasoning of Townley/Stormans to 
permit the corporate entity to assert the Free Exercise rights of its shareholders. Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 387 
(3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). See also Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1214–15 (D.D.C. 2013) (critiquing the Townley decision 
and describing it as providing “illusory” support for the plaintiff’s arguments of represen-
tational standing); Mersino Mgmt. Co., v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-11296, 2013 WL 3546702, 
at *13 n.10 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil Piercing to 
Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 235, 
240 (2013) (criticizing the lack of analysis employed in Townley, Stormans, and Tyndale 
in permitting a corporation to represent its owners’ Free Exercise rights: “To the contrary, 
its holding is best described as a statement of a conclusion rather than the result of an 
analytic process.”). 
184 Compare James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2247051 (last visited Jan. 12, 
2014) (“Business corporations should not generally be entitled to free exercise exemp-
tions, because they are constructed out of a pattern of detached individual relationships that 
do not lead to shared interests in collective development of conscience.”), with Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1133 (10th Cir. June 27, 2013) (quoting 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (noting that courts have “recognized a 
right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of 
religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable 
means of preserving other individual liberties.”)), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). On 
this point, the Tenth Circuit was simply in error. Persons do not associate in a commercial 
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The various corporations at the focus of this discussion lack a Free Exer-
cise right that they may vindicate for their own account. There are no absent 
owners whose rights could be violated were the corporations prevented from 
acting in a representational capacity. Additionally, although the Mandate may 
impose an indirect burden upon the corporations by defining minimum terms 
of health insurance policies,185 the corporate representation of its share-
holders’ interests does not impose that indirect burden upon the shareholders. 
Simply put, the necessary elements of representational standing are absent, 
and, even were that not the case, there remains no actionable injury conse-
quent to the Mandate. 
E. The Shareholders May Not Waive the Legal Separateness of the 
Corporation on a Whim 
Having chosen to organize a business in the corporate form, the share-
holders may not on a whim elect to ignore certain consequences of that 
choice; the separate legal personhood of the corporation must be respected.186 
As set forth by the Supreme Court in Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United 
States, “[o]ne who has created a corporate arrangement, chosen as a means 
of carrying out his business purposes, does not have the choice of disregard-
ing the corporate entity in order to avoid the obligations which the statute 
lays upon it for the protection of the public.”187 In this decision, the Court 
                                                                                                                         
venture for religious reasons, but rather for economic gain. To suggest those who undertake 
employment with corporations that evidence a religious element, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, 
What is a “Church”?: Implied Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 2013), agree to be bound thereby glosses over a variety of 
issues including the propriety of requiring prospective employees to undertake employer due 
diligence, the nature and sufficiency of indicia that would lead the employee to appreciate 
the religious character of the employer, the problems of possible changes in ownership/ 
management during the term of employment, and the absence of linkage between often 
ambiguous indicia and particular limits on the terms of the employment agreement. 
185 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(a)–(b) (West 2013). 
186 The author specifically disclaims considering whether the Mandate, applied to an in-
surance policy maintained for the employees of a sole proprietorship, would raise Free Exer-
cise Clause or RFRA issues. None of the Mandate cases to date have involved those facts. 
187 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946) (per curiam). See also Kreisler v. Goldberg, 478 F.3d 209, 
214 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The fact that a parent corporation has an ownership interest in a sub-
sidiary, however, does not give the parent any direct interest in the assets of the subsidiary. 
Although Bask could have established an ownership interest in the property, it chose not to 
do so. Instead, it created an LLC for the purpose of holding title to the property. Having 
assumed whatever benefits flowed from that decision, it cannot now ignore the existence 
of the LLC in order to escape its disadvantages.”); Michael J. Gaertner, Note, Reverse 
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rejected both the ability of a corporate parent to object to a claimed injury to 
its wholly-owned subsidiary188 and the conflation of distinct corporations.189 
While it may be asserted that a corporation is simply a matter of 
form190— an assertion that is demonstrably false—it is a form that matters. 
The very substance of corporate law, as well as a good deal of the law of 
agency, is the recognition of a legal person separate from its shareholders.191 
The form is not some fiction to be set aside by the shareholders when it is 
inconvenient for their desired goals. 
In addition to the many cases already cited,192 a pair of tax decisions 
highlights the absolute reality of both the corporate form and its distinction 
from the shareholders. In Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,193 the 
shareholder argued the gain on the sale of corporate-owned property should 
                                                                                                                         
Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation Owners Have It Both Ways?, 30 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 667, 683 (1989):  
First, courts view the corporation owner as having made an affirmative 
and intelligent choice to operate her business in the corporate form. 
According to this view, the corporation owner considered the respective 
advantages and disadvantages of the available business structures before 
selecting the corporate organization as the preferred mode of operation. 
As a result of this inquiry, the corporation owner was aware that the law 
views a corporation and its owners as separate entities. Because the cor-
poration chose the corporate form with knowledge of this fact, she cannot 
now decry her separate legal existence.  
188 Schenley, 326 U.S. at 435 (“The district court rightly held that the parent corporation 
had no standing to sue. It did not ask that a permit be issued to it, and its sole interest in the 
permit sought for its co-appellant was that of a stockholder. We have held that a minority 
stockholder of a carrier corporation cannot bring suit to set aside a commission order against 
the corporation.... For the parent is adequately represented for purposes of suit by the sub-
sidiary whose conduct of the litigation it controls.”). 
189 Id. at 432 (“[Separate] corporate entities may be disregarded where they are made 
the implement for avoiding a clear legislative purpose, they will not be disregarded where 
those in control have deliberately adopted the corporate form in order to secure its advantages 
and where no violence to the legislative purpose is done by treating the corporate entity as a 
separate legal person.”). 
190 See, e.g., Beckwith Electric Co. v. Sebelius, No. 8:13-cv-0648-T-17MAP, 2013 
WL 3297498, at *11 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2013) (“It would truly be form over substance to 
say there is a meaningful distinction between Beckwith Electric and Beckwith when it comes 
to religion.”); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1218 
(D.D.C. 2013) (describing the effect of incorporation as being a “fiction”). 
191 See supra notes 77–105 and accompanying text; see also Sanford A. Schane, The 
Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563 (1987) 
(explaining how the law treats a corporation as a separate legal entity). 
192 See, e.g., supra notes 77–105 and accompanying text. 
193 319 U.S. 436 (1943). 
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be attributed not to the corporation but to its sole shareholder.194 The Supreme 
Court rejected this effort to disregard the corporate form.195 In contrast, in 
United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co.,196 the Court rejected the 
government’s argument to treat what was structured as a sale of assets made 
by the shareholders, to whom the assets had been distributed by the corpora-
tion, as the sale of assets directly by the corporation. When Cumberland was 
decided, “[a] corporation selling its physical properties [was] taxed on capital 
gains resulting from the sale. There [was] no corporate tax, however, on dis-
tribution of assets in kind to shareholders as part of a genuine liquidation.”197 
The IRS sought to collapse the transaction’s steps,198 but the Supreme Court 
respected the separateness of the corporation and its shareholders. 
The separate legal personhood of the corporation may be set aside in ex-
ceptional circumstances199 under the equitable doctrine known as “piercing the 
veil.” In the classic “veil piercing” case, a corporation’s creditor demon-
strates that the liability shield normally afforded the shareholders should be 
set aside on one of several grounds.200 As such, piercing is a remedy that 
                                                                                                                         
194 Id. at 436 (“Petitioner [the corporation] seeks to have the gain on sales of its rental 
property treated as the gain of its sole stockholder and its corporate existence ignored as 
merely fictitious.”). 
195 Id. at 440. 
196 338 U.S. 451 (1950). 
197 Id. at 452 (footnotes omitted). This rule, commonly known as the General Utilities 
Doctrine, was repealed in 1986. See, e.g., 1 BORIS I. BITTKER AND JAMES S. EUSTICE, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 8.20 (7th ed. 2006). 
198 Cumberland, 338 U.S. at 453 (“Upon this sale by the shareholders, the Commissioner 
assessed and collected a $17,000 tax from the corporation on the theory that the shareholders 
had been used as a mere conduit for effectuating what was really a corporate sale.”). 
199 E.g., CNH Capital Am. LLC v. Hunt Tractor, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-350, 2013 WL 
1310878, at *17 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2013) (quoting Schultz v. Gen. Electric Healthcare 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 360 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Ky. 2012)) (“Generally, a corporation is viewed 
as a separate legal entity, and a court should disturb the notion of corporate separateness 
‘only in the rarest of circumstances.’”). 
200 E.g., In re Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The ‘classical’ piercing of 
the corporate veil is an equitable remedy whereby a court disregards ‘the existence of the 
corporation to make the corporation’s individual principals and their personal assets 
liable for the debts of the corporation.’”); STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE 
VEIL § 1:1 (2012) (“The ‘veil’ of the ‘corporate fiction,’ or the ‘artificial personality’ of the 
corporation, is ‘pierced,’ and the individual or corporate shareholder exposed to personal 
or corporate liability, as the case may be, when a court determines that the debt in question 
is not really a debt of the corporation, but ought, in fairness, to be viewed as a debt of the in-
dividual or corporate shareholder or shareholders.” (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)); 
I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 517 
(1912) (“When the conception of corporate entity is employed to defraud creditors, to evade 
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permits a corporation’s judgment-creditor to reach shareholder assets that 
have not been devoted to the corporate enterprise.201 In a typical reverse 
pierce—coined by Gregory Crespi and commonly referred to as an outsider 
reverse pierce—a shareholder’s creditor seeks to access corporate assets to 
satisfy the shareholder’s debt.202 In an insider reverse pierce, the shareholder 
seeks to set aside the partition between the shareholder and the assets de-
voted to the corporate enterprise in order to regain personal ownership of 
those assets.203 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge has proposed an analytic framework for 
the inside reverse pierce as a means of identifying which corporations may 
assert the shareholders’ religious beliefs in opposition to the Mandate.204 
While recognizing the conceptual problems with reverse veil piercing,205 his 
analysis fails to acknowledge the fact that courts have rejected most efforts 
at reverse veil piercing and that insider reverse piercing is an abuse of the 
veil piercing doctrine. 
As to the many rejections of reverse veil piercing, courts almost always 
respect the distinction between, on one hand, the owner and, on the other hand, 
the legal entity and its assets.206 Regarding the abuse of the concept of veil 
                                                                                                                         
an existing obligation, to circumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate monopoly, or to pro-
tect knavery or crime, the courts will draw aside the web of entity, will regard to corporate 
company as an association of live, up-and-doing, men and women shareholders, and will 
do justice between real persons.”). 
201 PRESSER, supra note 200, § 1:1. 
202 Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 
16 J. CORP. L. 33, 57 n.111 (1990). 
203 Id. at 37. 
204 Bainbridge, supra note 183, at 246–49. 
205 Id. at 245–46. 
206 See, e.g., Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 138 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) 
(declaring that a sole member of an LLC, who is not an attorney, may not represent the 
LLC in court); Terry v. Yancey, 344 F.2d 789, 790–91 (4th Cir. 1965) (“[W]here an in-
dividual creates a corporation as a means of carrying out [the individual’s] business pur-
poses [the individual] may not ignore the existence of the corporation in order to avoid its 
disadvantages.”); NAF Holdings, LLC v. Li & Fung (Trading) Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 5762(PAE), 
2013 WL 489020, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013) (determining that a parent company as a 
sole corporate shareholder may not directly bring suit to vindicate a claim of its wholly 
owned subsidiary); Finley v. Takisaki, No. C05-1118JLR, 2006 WL 1169794, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 28, 2006) (finding that members of an LLC lacked standing to assert a claim for 
injury to the LLC); Carey v. Howard, 950 So. 2d 1131, 1136-37 (Ala. 2006) (finding that 
members of an LLC lacked standing to sue for declaratory relief with respect to an option 
agreement between the LLC and a third party); Zipp v. Florian, No. CVN03101980, 2006 
WL 3719373, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2006) (finding that a member of an LLC 
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piercing, veil piercing itself is not a cause of action, but rather a remedy;207 
it is not a mechanism for a shareholder to access corporate assets for personal 
utilization outside of an interim or liquidating distribution from the venture.208 
Further, in the few cases in which insider reverse piercing has been permitted, 
it was permitted to allow an entity’s owner to take on the benefit of an asset 
owned by the entity.209 Those challenging the Mandate seek to effect an 
                                                                                                                         
lacked standing to bring suit based upon damage to property owned by the LLC); Smith 
v. Bear, Inc., No. 2010-CA-001803-MR, 2013 WL 1352148, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 
2013) (stating that a sole shareholder of a corporation, who is not an attorney, may not rep-
resent the corporation in court); Ne. Realty, L.L.C. v. Misty Bayou, L.L.C., 920 So. 2d 938, 
939, 941 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that members of an LLC lacked standing to intervene 
in an action against an LLC to quiet tax title); Cortellesso v. Town of Smithfield Zoning Bd. 
of Review, 888 A.2d 979, 981 (R.I. 2005) (finding that a sole member of an LLC lacked 
standing to appeal a zoning decision on the LLC’s property); see also Gaertner, supra note 
187, at 682: 
The traditional judicial response to the reverse pierce is an absolute refusal 
to pierce the corporate veil in favor of those who created it, the corporation 
owners. Courts base their refusal to reverse pierce on a strict adherence 
to the separate personality doctrine embodied in traditional corporate law. 
The “separate personality” approach enjoys widespread support and is 
clearly the majority view. 
207 See, e.g., Green v. Freeman, 749 S.E.2d 262, 271 (N.C. 2013) (“The doctrine of pierc-
ing the corporate veil is not a theory of liability. Rather, it provides an avenue to pursue legal 
claims against corporate officers or directors who would otherwise be shielded by the cor-
porate form.”); Inter-Tel Techs., Inc. v. Linn Station Props., LLC, 360 S.W.3d 152, 155 
(Ky. 2012); PRESSER, supra note 200, § 3:2 (quoting Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 
(1996)) (“‘Even if ERISA permits a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil, such piercing is 
not itself an independent ERISA cause of action and cannot independently support federal 
jurisdiction.’”). A similar holding was recently issued by the Supreme Court in a CERCLA 
contest. See U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 141 L. Ed. 2d 43, 46 Env’t. 
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1673, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 21225, 157 A.L.R. Fed. 735 (1998).”); Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 79 n.14. 
208 For that reason, namely the bastardization of a remedy into a cause of action, the very 
concept of inside reverse piercing should be entirely rejected. That is a discussion, however, 
for another day. 
209 Professor Bainbridge utilizes as the archetype of insider reverse piercing Cargill, 
Inc. v. Hedge, 375 N.W.2d 477, 478 (Minn. 1985), a case in which the shareholder success-
fully sought a homestead exemption for a home she had transferred to her wholly owned 
corporation. It needs to be recognized that numerous other cases have rejected efforts by 
owners to reverse pierce in order to claim the homestead exemption. E.g., In re Breece, 
487 B.R. 599 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2013) (refusing to allow a sole member of an LLC to 
reverse pierce the LLC holding title to the house in which she resided); In re Hecker, 414 
B.R. 499 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009) (rejecting insider reverse piercing to claim homestead 
exemption); Ala. Op. Att’y Gen., No. 2007-043, 2007 WL 505806 (Feb. 9, 2007) (stating 
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insider reverse pierce not to take on a benefit of the entity but rather a 
burden, and then to object to the “imposition” of that burden.210 
Even as courts are exceptionally reluctant to set aside the veil in order to 
permit the owners to enjoy the benefit of entity assets, courts should cate-
gorically reject an effort to reverse pierce for the purpose of claiming per-
sonal liability on an entity obligation and then asserting the now assumed 
obligation infringes on the owners’ Free Exercise rights. One is reminded of 
the classic description of chutzpah, namely killing your parents and then 
throwing yourself on the mercy of the court because you are an orphan.211 
Similarly, a shareholder may not engage the extraordinary remedy of an in-
sider reverse pierce and then object to the consequences thereof. 
F. The Burdens Imposed Upon a Corporation by the Mandate Are Not 
Imposed on the Owners Thereof 
Up to this point, the focus of the discussion has been upon standing. The 
corporation does not have standing to object to a legal obligation under 
either the Free Exercise Clause or the RFRA and the shareholders do not have 
standing to object to the corporation’s legal obligations based on their per-
sonal religious beliefs. There is also the point that shareholder standing is 
                                                                                                                         
that a homestead exemption is not available for property owned by an LLC); see also In 
re Stella, 470 B.R. 1, 13–16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (precluding the claiming of a home-
stead exemption in property held in trust); 3519-3513 Realty, LLC v. Law, 967 A.2d 954, 
955–56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (holding the member of an LLC could not utilize 
the statutory right of property owner to “personally occupy a unit” in a multi-unit dwelling 
when the LLC, and not the member, was the owner of the property). 
210 It is beyond the scope of this discussion, but there is a question as to whether Hobby 
Lobby and/or the Green family may challenge the Mandate when they failed to utilize an 
available regulatory exemption. Plans that are “grandfathered” are exempt from the Mandate, 
and Hobby Lobby failed to grandfather its plans. Complaint at ¶ 59, Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. Civ-12-1000-HE) (“Before 
the Mandate was issued, Hobby Lobby made the decision not to retain grandfathered status 
under the Affordable Care Act. Neither its 2011 nor its 2012 plan materials included a notice 
of grandfather status. Therefore Hobby Lobby’s insurance plan is not grandfathered.”). See 
45 C.F.R. § 147.140(a)(1)(i); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-1251T(a)(1)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-
1251(a)(1)(i).”). Having apparently intentionally forsaken protection from the Mandate’s 
requirements, it is uncertain whether Hobby Lobby or the Greens may now legitimately 
claim the Mandate imposes an unjust burden. 
211 See, e.g., Wingate v. Celebrity Cruises, Ltd., 79 So. 3d 180, 183 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2012); Steven B. Spector, Chutzpah and the Law, 87 LAW LIBR. J. 357, 357 (1995); 
see also J.A. SIMPSON & E.S.C. WEINER, 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 209 (2d 
ed. 1991) (defining the term “chutzpah”). 
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lacking due to the attenuated link between a shareholder and the conduct 
that gives rise to the asserted religious objections. 
Even assuming all shareholders of the various corporations that have 
brought suits challenging the Mandate object to all or some aspects thereof,212 
it does not follow that the shareholders are burdened by the Mandate.213 
Rather, the shareholders are so distant from the Mandate that they have no 
standing to object thereto. 
The burden of the Mandate is not imposed upon employers, but rather 
initially upon the group insurance plan214 and only secondarily upon the 
                                                                                                                         
212 To date, the courts have not considered how an objection to the Mandate by some, 
but fewer than all, shareholders would be addressed. If some but not all shareholders hold 
beliefs, and if the religious beliefs of the shareholders can be attributed to the corporation (a 
position rejected by this analysis), is it only the beliefs of the majority shareholder block? 
Consider a corporation with two classes of stock, Class A (voting) and Class B (non-voting). 
The Class A stock represents twenty percent of the total equity, but it alone elects the board of 
directors. If the sole shareholder of the Class A stock holds religious beliefs in opposition 
to the Mandate, but the holders of the Class B stock do not hold those views or even support 
the Mandate, is the examination of the “corporation’s religious views” based upon those 
of the shareholder empowered to elect the board of directors or upon those of all share-
holders irrespective of their capacity to elect directors? Alternatively, assume the reverse: 
the holders of the Class A stock have no objection to the Mandate. There is then a change of 
control, and the new sole holder of the Class A stock has strong and sincere objections to 
the Mandate. May that view be newly ascribed to the corporation, giving it the opportunity 
to require its employee group insurance plan to exclude, based upon the Free Exercise and 
RFRA rights of the new Class A shareholder, the coverage required by the Mandate? If the 
shares are held in trust, would it be appropriate to examine the views of the trustees, as the 
title owners of the shares (see, e.g., 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003); id. § 3(3); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959); id. § 2, cmts. d, h; id. § 3(3)), or the views 
of the trust’s beneficiaries? 
213 Even if The Blunt Amendment had passed, see supra notes 67–68 and accompanying 
text, it would not follow that the religious beliefs of the shareholders would be controlling 
as to the availability of a conscience objection from the requirements of the Mandate. Under 
the language proposed by The Blunt Amendment, coverage could be declined on the basis 
of the “religious beliefs or moral convictions of the sponsor, issuer or other entity offering 
the plan” or on the basis it “is contrary to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of the 
purchaser or beneficiary of the coverage.” With respect to a for-profit business venture, the 
terms “sponsor,” “issuer,” “other entity offering the plan,” and “purchaser” would refer to 
the corporation or similar business entity, not to its constituent owners. Admittedly, under 
any fair reading of The Blunt Amendment, Senator Blunt assumed the business entity would 
constitute the “purchaser” of the plan, and the religious and moral views of its owners would 
be ascribed to the entity. That is not, however, what The Blunt Amendment said. Regard-
less, that analytic path is structurally flawed for the reasons demonstrated herein. 
214 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (West 2013) (requiring group health insurance 
plans to contain provisions satisfying the terms of the Mandate). 
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employer that purchases the plan for the benefit of its employees. No bur-
den is imposed directly upon the owners of the employer.215  Between the 
shareholders and the corporation’s purchase of a group health insurance 
plan complying with the Mandate is the election of the board of directors, 
the board’s decision to maintain an employee group health insurance plan, 
the board’s designation of corporate officers, an officer executing the group 
health plan agreement on behalf of the corporation, and the corporation 
paying for the plan with its funds and perhaps with contributions from the 
employee-participants. At this juncture there has been no conduct that can 
conceivably give rise to a shareholder complaint; no shareholder has been 
involved in any action, no shareholder assets have been expended,216 and no 
person has acquired any contraceptive drug, device, or procedure through the 
                                                                                                                         
215 See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 715 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he Kortes and the Grotes bear no personal obligation to pay for the coverage.”); 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 
F.3d 377, 409 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Since Conestoga is distinct from the Hahns, the Mandate 
does not actually require the Hahns to do anything.”), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); 
Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1677, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15807 (6th Cir. June 28, 
2013) (“Moreover, the burden Potter claims is too attenuated. The contraceptive mandate is 
imposed on Eden Foods, not Potter.”); Mersino Mgmt. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-11296, 
2013 WL 3546702, at *11 (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2013) (“Karen and Rodney Mersino, who 
are not required individually to comply with the regulations, do not suffer actual injury (they 
incur no out of pocket costs as individuals) from the contraceptive coverage mandate that 
would imbue them with Article III standing to challenge the regulations separate and apart 
from the corporate entity that is required to comply with the regulations.”); Eden Foods, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The Affordable Care Act’s contra-
ceptive mandate imposes duties and potential penalties upon Eden Foods only, not upon 
Potter, despite his status as the sole shareholder of the corporation.”). When the employer is 
self-insured, the attenuation between the shareholder and the insurance provider is reduced 
by one degree, but the fact remains that it is the corporation—a jural entity separate and dis-
tinct from the shareholders—that shoulders the burden. See Gilardi v. Sebelius, 926 F. 
Supp.2d 273, 283-84 (D.D.C. 2013). See also Oral Argument, Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 13–1144) (“[F]or 200 
years no corporation or sole shareholder has ever obtained an exemption from any form of 
regulation on the theory that’s being urged here, which is that you pass through the cor-
poration and treat corporate regulations as if it were regulation of the CEO or controlling 
shareholder.”). But see Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 
1217 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The burden on religious exercise does not occur at the point of 
contraceptive purchase; instead, it occurs when a company’s owners fill the basket of goods 
and services that constitute a healthcare plan.”). 
216 See also Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 388 (“[I]t is Conestoga that must provide the 
funds to comply with the Mandate—not the Hahns.”). 
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corporate-maintained health insurance plan. Rather, it will not be until a bene-
ficiary of the plan (who may not be an employee of the plan sponsor and may 
not share the religious beliefs of the corporation’s shareholders)217 purchases 
the contraceptive drug, device, or procedure, often in consultation with a 
physician,218 and either submits the invoice or seeks reimbursement from the 
insurer that there will be even a tenuous relationship between the shareholder 
and the asserted sinful conduct. 
The attenuated connection between a shareholder’s religious views and 
the act of a plan beneficiary engaging in entirely legal conduct precludes both 
standing to assert a Free Exercise right and showing a significant burden.219 
Nothing done by the shareholders is implicated in the decision to provide an 
                                                                                                                         
217 The Peace of Augsburg’s principle cuius regio, eius religio does not apply in 
American corporate law to bind the employees to the religious views of the corporation’s 
shareholders. See Germany, Religious War and the Power of Augsburg, ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/231186/Germany 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
218 For example, Plan B is available without a physician’s involvement, but daily birth 
control pills require a prescription. 
219 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(a) (West 2013) 
(“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion ....”); O’Brien v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1159 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (“RFRA 
does not protect against the slight burden on religious exercise that arises when one’s money 
circuitously flows to support the conduct of other free-exercise-wielding individuals who hold 
religious beliefs that differ from one’s own.”); Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,887 (July 2, 2013) (“And even if 
the accommodations were found to impose some minimal burden on eligible organizations, 
any such burden would not be substantial for the purposes of RFRA because a third party 
pays for the contraceptive services and there are multiple degrees of separation between the 
eligible organization and any individual’s choice to use contraceptive services. ... [W]hether 
such services will be utilized is the result of independent choices by employees or students 
and their dependents, who have distinct interests and may have their own religious views that 
differ from those of the eligible organization.”). See also Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 
supra note 128, at 157–60. In this respect, the Mandate resembles the “released time” pro-
gram considered and approved over a Free Exercise challenge in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U.S. 306, 306, 308 (1952). Under this program, public school students were permitted to 
leave the school premises to attend religious instruction during the school day. In response 
to a Free Exercise challenge, the Court wrote: 
[i]t takes obtuse reasoning to inject any issue of the ‘free exercise’ of 
religion into the present case. No one is forced to go to the religious class-
room and no religious exercise or instruction is brought to the classrooms 
of the public schools. A student need not take religious instruction. He is 
left to his own desires as to the manner or time of his religious devotions, 
if any.  
Id. at 311. 
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employee health insurance plan that complies with the Mandate or in the 
decision by someone to utilize Mandate-covered goods or services.220 
Further, these shareholders profess that merely permitting the corporation 
to provide insurance coverage for contraception, they are forced to facilitate 
conduct they believe to be sinful and proscribed.221 This position is without 
merit. Illustrative for these purposes is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,222 wherein a challenge was brought to certain 
government funded school vouchers that were applied almost exclusively 
to religious schools.223  The opponents of the program argued that the 
voucher program violated the Establishment Clause224 by signaling gov-
ernmental endorsement of religion225 in facilitating religious teaching by 
                                                                                                                         
220 Some of those objecting to the Mandate have sought to shorten the chain of attenuation 
by focusing not upon the ultimate utilization of the benefit but rather upon its prior fund-
ing. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 6:58, 7:23, Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013), 
available at http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2013/lj.12-3841.12-3841_05_22_2013.mp3 
(“Here, the Kortes’ specific objection is not just the facilitation. It’s the arranging for, pay-
ing for, subsidizing, providing and facilitating.... It’s having to pick up the phone and call the 
insurance company to say, ‘Send us a policy and a contract that provides this coverage.’”); 
Complaint ¶ 10, Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. April 30, 2012) 
(No. 1:12-cv-1123). See also Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 
1208, 1217 (“The burden on religious exercise does not occur at the point of contraceptive 
purchase; instead, it occurs when a company’s owners fill the basket of goods and services 
that constitute a healthcare plan.”). These efforts fail to account for the numerous still-
extant steps between the shareholders and the action of the corporation’s officers to imple-
ment a group health care policy. 
If shareholders are permitted to object to the corporate group health insurance plan’s 
coverage of goods and services they consider sinful, there is no clear reason those same 
shareholders cannot prevent the employees from using other compensation (hourly wages, 
salary, and bonuses) to pay directly for contraceptives, alcoholic beverages (see Global 
Survey of Evangelical Protestant Leaders, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 45 (June 22, 2011)), 
or tobacco. See also Corbin, Debate, supra note 128, at 271. The plurality in Hobby 
Lobby indicated that such conduct would not amount to a violation of the government’s 
compelling interest in the uniform enforcement of labor laws. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1141 n.16. (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). This 
assertion begs the question of why is the uniform application of the Mandate to all for-
profit ventures with fifty or more employees not a compelling government interest? 
221 See Korte, Oral Argument, supra note 220; Newland, Complaint, supra note 220, 
at ¶ 32. 
222 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
223 Id. at 647 (stating that ninety-six percent of voucher recipients utilized them at re-
ligious schools). 
224 Id. at 648. 
225 Id. at 654. 
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funding proselytization.226 Rejecting both of these claims, the Court held that 
any religious conduct could not be attributed to the state consequent to the 
attenuated link between funding the venture and the ultimate disbursement 
of the related funds. Rather, there were intervening independent acts, namely 
the decision by a voucher-holder to utilize it at a religious institution.227 
Therefore, it was not the state that decided to fund and endorse a religious 
institution, but rather individuals making a free decision with the voucher 
provided to them. That intervening individual election broke any linkage be-
tween state action and religious conduct for purposes of the Establishment 
Clause.228 Admittedly this analysis concerns rights guaranteed by the Free 
Exercise Clause rather than the Establishment Clause, but there is no analytic 
basis for a distinction. A Free Exercise “burden” may be used as a proxy for 
an Establishment “excessive entanglement.”229 More directly on point, and 
squarely acknowledging that attenuation invalidates a claim of Free Exercise 
burden, is Goehring v. Brophy,230 in which certain students objected, on Free 
Exercise grounds, to a university registration fee utilized in part to fund stu-
dent health insurance that covered abortion.231 That claim was rejected on 
the basis that, due to attenuation, there was no burden on Free Exercise.232 
                                                                                                                         
226 Id. at 649. 
227 Id. at 649–53. 
228 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
508–09 (1997) (finding the RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state action); Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 9 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the 
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986) (“[A]ny aid provided under Washington’s program that 
ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent 
and private choices of aid recipients.”); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) (“It is 
true, of course, that financial assistance provided to parents ultimately has an economic 
effect comparable to that of aid given directly to the schools attended by their children. It is 
also true, however, that under Minnesota’s arrangement public funds become available only 
as a result of numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age children.”). 
229 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
230 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
231 See id. at 1298 (“The plaintiffs in the present case, undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents, object to subsidizing the cost of abortions through their student registration fee 
subsidy. The plaintiffs allege that their sincerely held religious beliefs prevent them from 
financially contributing to abortions, and therefore, the student subsidy violates their right 
to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.”). 
232 Id. at 1300 (“Moreover, the student health insurance subsidy is not a substantial sum 
of money and the subsidy, taken from registration fees, is distributed only for those students 
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Suggestions that either (1) shareholder funds pay for a Mandate-
compliant insurance policy or (2) the penalties imposed for non-compliance 
with the Mandate233 are extracted from shareholders are without merit. Both 
plan costs and penalties are liabilities of the corporation; no shareholder is 
liable thereon. The funds used to satisfy those obligations are corporate 
property, not assets of the shareholders.234 These facts are not altered if the 
corporation elects to be a Small Business Corporation (S-corp).235 The same 
principles apply as well to LLCs.236 
CONCLUSION 
“I DIDN’T APPROVE ANY SHIPMENT.” “THEN YOUR COMPANY 
DID.” “I’M NOT MY COMPANY.”237 
 
While drawn from a movie about a comic book character, these words 
sum up a crucial dogma of the law of business organizations, namely that 
the corporation and its owners are legally distinct from one another. It is not 
doubted that the shareholders, most often Roman Catholic, of the various for-
profit business ventures that have brought challenges to the Mandate have 
sincerely held religious based objections to the goods and services that the 
Mandate requires as benefits under group insurance plans. Those same share-
holders have failed, however, to understand that they are not the corporation 
and the corporation is not them. Rather, the shareholders are legally distinct 
persons, and the corporation, as a legal person, has of itself no religious faith 
                                                                                                                         
who elect to purchase University insurance. Furthermore, the plaintiffs are not required to 
accept, participate in, or advocate in any manner for the provision of abortion services.”). 
233 See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra notes 86, 92 and accompanying text. 
235 Under the S-corp system, the taxes imposed upon corporate activities are satisfied by 
the shareholders. It remains, however, that S-corp shareholders enjoy limited liability, the 
usual rules of agency control, the determination of corporate policy remains with the board 
of directors, and the corporation’s assets remain its own. See also Korte v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735, 742 n.11 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (quoting ROBERT 
R. KEATINGE & ANN E. CONAWAY, KEATINGE AND CONAWAY ON CHOICE OF BUSINESS 
ENTITY: SELECTING FORM AND STRUCTURE OF THE CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS § 14:2 
(2012)); supra notes 77–105 and accompanying text. But see Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Randolph, J. concurring) 
(noting that “Subchapter S disregards the corporate form for purposes of the corporate in-
come tax” and arguing that as the Mandate is enforced by means of the tax code, its imposi-
tions should be considered as being imposed upon the shareholders). 
236 See, e.g., supra notes 84, 86. 
237 IRON MAN (Paramount Pictures 2008). 
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or beliefs.238 Although a court may not second-guess an individual’s assess-
ment of what is required of them by sincerely held religious beliefs,239 a court 
may look to a religion’s objective faith pronouncements to assess whether 
a corporation or other legal construct can practice that religion on its own 
account.240 On that basis, a court should conclude that a corporation has no 
Free Exercise rights and, therefore, no rights under RFRA. It necessarily fol-
lows that the Mandate does not violate the corporation’s religious views. 
As to the religious beliefs of the shareholders, while they may personally 
determine to avoid the drugs and procedures required to be covered by the 
Mandate, their personal views in no manner inform the corporation’s obli-
gation to comply with applicable law. The legal reality is that the Mandate 
imposes no obligation upon the shareholders of these ventures. For any num-
ber of reasons, the owners of the corporations now challenging the Mandate 
chose to organize business ventures in the corporate form. There resulted 
from that election a wide variety of consequences, including the rule that the 
actions of the corporation are those of a legally recognized person distinct 
from the shareholders either individually or collectively. Those legal conse-
quences cannot be selectively ignored to create an objection to the Mandate 
where one would otherwise not exist. 
The venerable principle damnum absque injuria241 is applicable here. 
The Mandate imposes no obligation that of itself gives rise to a legally 
cognizable injury to any of the plaintiffs objecting to the Mandate; the 
                                                                                                                         
238 See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir.) (“[A] for-profit, secular corporation cannot engage in 
the exercise of religion.”), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). But see Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, at *1135 (10th Cir.) (stating that Hobby Lobby, as a corpo-
ration, exercises its religion through proselytizing), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
239 Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 408. 
240 Id. 
241 In Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled: 
The term “direct injury” is there used in its legal sense, as meaning a 
wrong which directly results in the violation of a legal right. “An injury, 
legally speaking, consists of a wrong done to a person, or, in other words, 
a violation of his right. It is an ancient maxim, that a damage to one, with-
out an injury in this sense (damnum absque injuria), does not lay the 
foundation of an action; because, if the act complained of does not violate 
any of his legal rights, it is obvious, that he has no cause to complain.... 
Want of right and want of remedy are justly said to be reciprocal. Where 
therefore there has been a violation of a right, the person injured is entitled 
to an action.” The converse is equally true, that where, although there is 
damage, there is no violation of a right no action can be maintained.  
(citation omitted).  
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entity owners are not subject to the Mandate and the entities have no Free 
Exercise right impacted by compliance therewith. The corporations and 
LLCs purchasing the insurance policies with Mandate-required benefits bear 
no ill effect therefrom, and the ability of the owners to personally promote 
the message that contraception and abortion are morally abhorrent by way 
of contributions and underwriting is not restricted.242 
The corporate challenges to the Mandate fail as a matter of the law of 
business entities, and on that basis they should be dismissed. 
                                                                                                                         
242 See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1237 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (Edwards, J., dissenting): 
There are three reasons why the Mandate does not substantially burden 
the Gilardis’ “exercise of religion.” First, the Mandate does not require the 
Gilardis to use or purchase contraception themselves. Second, the Mandate 
does not require the Gilardis to encourage Freshway’s employees to use 
contraceptives any more directly than they do by authorizing Freshway 
to pay wages. Finally, the Gilardis remain free to express publicly their 
disapproval of contraceptive products. 
